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ABSTRACT 
Essays on the Economics of Driving and Health   
by  
Jessica Lynn Peck  
Advisor: David A. Jaeger 
 
This dissertation comprises three essays on the economics of driving and health. The first 
examines the effect of the ride-hailing service Uber, its launch in New York City in May 2011, 
and the resulting drunk-driving outcomes in the counties that received service compared with 
those that did not. The difference-in-differences estimation of this effect implies a 25 to 35 
percent decrease in the alcohol-related collision rate for the affected New York City boroughs, or 
about 40 collisions per month. With differentiated treatment effects for each affected county, the 
difference-in-differences effect is higher for Manhattan, middling for the Bronx and Brooklyn, 
and lower for Queens. A synthetic control analysis shows pronounced effects over time in the 
Bronx and Brooklyn, and a permutation test confirms the effect is not commonly reproducible 
using untreated counties. 
In the second essay, I survey and evaluate the literature on the drunk-driving effects of 
ride-hailing services like Uber. All but one of these studies finds a measurable negative effect of 
ride-hailing presence on drunk-driving measures, and I replicate this outlier study with checks 
for robustness to empirical choices. The robustness checks do not overturn the result. Special 
emphasis is placed on the differences in interpretation between the five studies’ estimated results 
that distinguish their external validity despite their focus on the same essential research question. 
In the third essay, I investigate the effect of revisions to Australian state graduated driver 
licensing laws on road fatalities of Australian youths between 16 and 21 years of age. While all 
of the Australian states and territories implemented a three-tier graduated licensing scheme for 
the protection and education of young drivers in the 1990s, many states also implemented 
revisions to those laws that increased the restrictions and hurdles for young drivers navigating 
the graduated licensing tiers. The difference-in-difference-in-differences estimation controls for 
age, state, and time effects as well as all interaction effects, but finds no measurable effect of 
increased driver-training restrictions on youth road fatalities. An aggregated specification 
comparing ever-treated youths to older cohorts finds one marginally significant, positive effect 
that is not robust to changes in specification. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 In this dissertation, I present several essays on the economics of driving and health. For at 
least 60 years, the United States, Australia, and other OECD countries have enacted and revised 
policies on driver training, poor driver behavior, and drunk driving, in successive attempts to 
reduce the human cost of automotive mobility. The empirical health economics literature that 
uses driving law changes as natural experiments or driving collisions as a measurable policy 
target is broad, in part because reducing casualties and fatalities from driving seems achievable 
with the right combination of science, incentives, and policy. Youth fatalities in the U.S. are 
primarily accidental, resulting from events like traffic collisions and accidental poisoning. The 
latter has taken the lead this decade as automobile policy and technology suppress the road 
deaths and the opioid crisis exacerbates youths’ access to high doses of poisonous substances. 
Driver education programs aim to reduce the road collisions and, by extension, the resulting 
injuries or deaths. Likewise, suppressing unambiguously bad driving behavior like drunk driving 
can serve as a politically expedient lever on road injuries and fatalities.  
 In Chapter 2, “New York City Drunk Driving After Uber,” I exploit the arrival of the 
ride-hailing service in four New York City counties as a natural experiment using a difference-
in-differences estimation strategy. I compare the effect of this market entrance on the alcohol-
related collision rate in New York State counties that receive ride-hailing access to those that did 
not. I find that there was a 25 to 35 percent decrease in the alcohol-related collision rate in 
counties that received ride-hailing access. This is a larger effect than similar literature in this 
area. This effect’s magnitude might be expected, however, because this study examines an urban 
environment with an established history of public transit usage. I contribute to the literature on 
drunk driving and ride-hailing with the only study using alcohol-related collisions rather than a 
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fatality measure, and as the only study focusing on the ride-hailing introduction in New York 
State.  
 In Chapter 3, “Estimating Drunk-Driving Effects of Ride-Hailing with Traffic Fatalities 
Data,” I present a detailed comparison of the five studies that examine the introduction of ride-
hailing as a source of drunk-driving reduction. Each of the studies approaches the same research 
question with slightly different data and methodologies. These studies present a range of 
estimated effects from a decrease of 3 percent to a decrease of 35 percent depending on the 
location, observational units, and drunk-driving proxy specified in the study’s empirical 
approach. With one exception, they find that the introduction of ride-hailing reduced drunk-
driving outcomes. Subtle differences exist between the interpretation and external validity of 
each study, which is helpful in establishing a range of interpretable outcomes for locations that 
may receive ride-hailing in the future. Since there is only one study that finds no effect, I 
replicate that study using the same data sample and methodology. Conditional on using the same 
data sample the results are robust to differing methodologies and to some extent, changes to the 
data sample timeframe and set of cross-sectional units.  
In Chapter 4, “Graduated Licensing Revision and Youth Road Fatalities in Australia,” I 
use revisions to Australian states’ established graduated-licensing laws as a natural experiment to 
examine the effect of training intensity on youth-driver fatalities. The revisions added a 
collection of bans, exams, rules, and requirements to the typical novice-driver training 
progression. While many studies have examined the effect of graduated licensing on youth 
collisions and fatalities, this study focuses on identifying the effect of the “add on” policies that 
are often implemented at the same time as the initial graduated licensing timeline. I find no effect 
of increased training intensity on youth driver fatalities. This result has cost-benefit implications 
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for states and countries attempting to reduce youth-driver fatalities through bans, rules, exams, 
and logbooks.  
The three studies in this dissertation show that while improved driver training and drunk 
driving suppression are important public-health goals, public policy can miss the mechanism in 
either direction. The context for this work on cab services and driver training is the technological 
change that has molded human interaction with cars. Since the 1980s, the automotive industry 
has remanufactured a heavy, analog, manual machine into a device run by small pieces of the 
computer industry. Drivers not only expect their pocket computers to come along for the ride, 
perhaps interfacing with their cars, but also to possess technological interfaces of their own. In 
Chapter 2 and 3 of this dissertation, I study a piece of technological change that intends to 
replace a drivers’ own car, if only for some trips, with another driver’s car. In Chapter 4, I study 
an innovation in novice-driver training, one of the last pieces of automobile operation that 
remains under analog, human control. One of the most popular new driver-training methods, 
introducing a set of restrictions and requirements for novice drivers, fails to produce a 
consequential effect in Australia. Taken together, the studies in this dissertation suggest further 
research is needed to determine whether driver training has exhausted its ability to improve 
health outcomes, and if so, whether driving should be discouraged through the public provision 
of a feasible substitute. Both novice-driver collision rates and the level of drunk-driving collision 
rates may have reached a natural floor under current training methods and laws, absent further 
development in the direction of self-driving cars.  
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CHAPTER 2: NEW YORK CITY DRUNK DRIVING AFTER UBER 
 
Despite fifty years of new traffic policies and research, intoxicated driving is still a 
leading cause of death and injury in the United States. Intoxicated crashes accounted for 31 
percent of road fatalities in the United States in 2014.1 Most policy efforts to combat drunk 
driving have been punitive, impeding access to alcohol or increasing drunk driving’s cost for 
violators. For example, state laws raised and then standardized the drinking age at 21 by the mid 
1980s across U.S. states. “Dry counties” and “blue laws” restricted the sale of alcohol based on 
place or time, though research in health economics has demonstrated that banning the sale of 
alcohol in a county does not necessarily suppress drunk driving.2 Alcohol price increases through 
excise taxes increased the cost of drinking, decreasing alcohol consumption and by extension, 
drunk driving.3 State laws sought to define the line between sober and intoxicated driving by 
imposing differential penalties at higher blood alcohol content (BAC) levels, and zero-tolerance 
BAC laws for minors.4 Some states instituted immediate license suspension or differential 
license suspension for those caught driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.5 Lawmakers 
                                                
1 The Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) dataset, a census of U.S. traffic fatalities, contained 32,675 road 
fatalities nationwide in 2014, and 9,967 road fatalities from alcohol-related collisions. Department of Transportation 
(U.S.), National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). Traffic Safety Facts 2014 data: alcohol-
impaired driving. Washington, DC: NHTSA; 2015. 
2 Lovenheim and Slemrod (2010) examine the cost of drinking-age law evasion for heterogeneous state drinking-age 
laws. Dee and Evans (2001a) and Carpenter and Dobkin (2011) give an overview of the effect of increasing the 
drinking age nationwide. Baughman et al. (2001) show that allowing the sale of beer and wine may reduce the 
drunk-driving toll in a county, though the sale of hard liquor may increase drunk driving. 
3 Grossman and Saffer (1987) are the first of many authors to exploit the variation in various alcohol prices, 
especially through excise taxes, to measure price elasticities for youth road fatalities. Increases in alcohol prices 
cause decreases in alcohol consumption and binge drinking. Decreases in alcohol consumption lead to fewer adverse 
consequences of drinking, including drunk-driving fatalities.  
4 Dee (2001) indicates that setting a 0.08 BAC as the limit between intoxicated and sober driving was effective in 
reducing road fatalities from drunk driving. Carpenter (2004) shows that zero-tolerance (zero BAC) limits for 
minors produce no robust drunk-driving effects for either gender.  
5 Benson and Ramussen (1999) examine several policies that potentially deter drunk-driving infractions. Evans, 
Neville and Graham (1991) show that an increase in putative punishment severity (rather than increase in probability 
of detection) produces no measurable decrease in drunk driving.  
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failed to mandate ignition locks following research on the efficacy of physically restricting 
intoxicated drivers’ car access, though vehicle use is the resolvable variable after intoxication is 
certain.6 No laws have sought to make the lawful vehicle-use alternative to drunk driving more 
attractive. 
A recent increase in the ease and availability of alternative rides for intoxicated 
passengers partially explains the steep decrease in alcohol-related collisions in New York City 
since 2011. I examine the specific case of Uber’s car-service launch in New York City in May 
2011, a unique example of a sudden increase in cab availability for intoxicated passengers.7 This 
study draws on a dataset of all New York State alcohol-related collisions maintained by the New 
York State Department of Motor Vehicles from 1989 through 2013. My inference is based on the 
variation in Uber access across New York State counties over time and the careful choice of New 
York State counties that provide an appropriate control group for New York City’s drunk-driving 
behavior. 
My econometric analyses show that the New York City boroughs that experienced 
significant Uber service coverage (Manhattan, the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens) experienced a 
25 to 35 percent decrease in the alcohol-related collision rate using difference-in-differences 
estimation and standard errors clustered at the county level. My most conservative estimate of 
this intent-to-treat (ITT) effect implies a decrease of approximately 43 crashes per month across 
                                                
6 Coben and Larken (1999) estimate that interlock devices reduce DUI recidivism between 15 and 65 percent during 
the period of observation in their study.  
7 Uber is a service that matches cab drivers and passengers using a smartphone app and a location-based matching 
algorithm. Passengers pay through the smartphone app with previously-submitted credit card details, and receive an 
emailed receipt after the ride. Drivers are summoned to the passengers’ GPS location unless the passenger specifies 
a street address. Compared to street-hail taxis or livery taxis, Uber is a particularly innovative tool for an intoxicated 
or disoriented passenger: they need not carry or acquire sufficient cash for a taxi ride, and the ride can be summoned 
to a precise GPS location. A general overview of Uber’s purpose circa 2011 (near the time of Uber’s introduction in 
New York City) can be found in Wired (http://www.wired.com/2011/04/app-stars-uber/), last downloaded 
September 12, 2017.   
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the New York City boroughs with Uber coverage, relative to pre-period collision rates and 
population. This outcome differs from previous research on drunk driving and ride-hailing in its 
magnitude and its methodology. I focus on New York State to maintain consistent state laws, 
unlike the national studies from Dills and Mullholland (2017) and Brazil and Kirk (2016). I use 
the larger scope of alcohol-related collisions rather than the fatal collisions that Dills and 
Mullholland (2017), Brazil and Kirk (2016), and Greenwood and Wattal (2016) use to study the 
drunk-driving link. Where Brazil and Kirk (2016) find no effect, and Greenwood and Wattal 
(2017) find a modest effect, I find a much larger effect, between 25 to 35 percent in some 
specifications, that exceeds the 6 to 27 percent decrease that Dills and Mullholland (2017) find 
on DUI arrest rates.  
The main challenge to inference rests on the choice of a control group that constitutes a 
valid counterfactual to New York City before and after the introduction of Uber. The 
determinants of drunk driving are not well understood, but are generally unobservable in my data 
(i.e.: probability of getting caught, cost of punishment, cost of alcohol, availability of alcohol, 
family or peer attitudes towards alcohol, and age of the driver) or are observable but not, or 
nearly not, time-varying (i.e. the number of bars or liquor stores in the county). Instead I choose 
control counties based on geographic location, population density, and similarity of a county’s 
pre-Uber drunk-driving rate to New York City’s drunk-driving rate.  
To examine the robustness of these difference-in-differences estimates, I run a placebo 
test by choosing a random intervention date in the pre-treatment period. While some effects are 
significant at the 5 percent level, small changes in the specification of the estimating equation 
lead to a lack of significance and in some cases a change in the sign of the effect. The standard 
difference-in-differences estimates embody an average effect over all the New York City 
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boroughs that received Uber access. To examine the county-by-county effects, I also estimate 
separate treatment effects for each treated borough. I find that Uber’s entrance produced larger 
effects for Manhattan, middling effects for Brooklyn and the Bronx, and smaller effects for 
Queens. This runs counter to the expected effects if the average estimates were evenly 
distributed over the population of each affected borough. This distribution suggests that Uber’s 
launch did not simply fill in neighborhoods underserved by existing public transit. 
I present evidence of the dynamic effects on each affected borough both in a differences-
in-differences model and through synthetic control analysis. The post-Uber yearly treatment 
effects in a differences-in-differences framework show an effect that grows over time, which fits 
a consumer-learning or fleet-expansion story. Separate synthetic control estimates for each 
borough similarly show a large period of decrease in drunk-driving rates after Uber’s launch date 
in New York City, but those effects taper off by the end of the sample period in 2013. To test the 
robustness of the synthetic control estimates, I produce a permutation test (Abadie et al. 2010) to 
show that the affected New York City boroughs experienced an extreme drop in their alcohol-
related collision rate, compared to all synthetic control estimates that could be produced with any 
other New York State county. 
While many economists have used taxi datasets to examine labor supply and industrial 
organization topics, this paper contributes to the drunk-driving policy literature in health 
economics as one of the first to examine Uber’s effect on drunk driving in the cities where it 
operates.8 The discussion of this effect in the context of New York City is advantageous because 
                                                
8 See Camerer et al. (1997), Chou (2002), Farber (2005), and Farber (2015) for taxi drivers’ intertemporal 
substitution of labor hours. Frechette, Lizzeri and Saltz (2015) model the taxi market as perfectly competitive with 
regulation and search frictions, drivers who behave as independent profit-maximizers, and prices set by the 
regulator. Greenwood and Wattal (2015) examine the effect of the Uber rollout across localities in California on 
motor vehicle deaths. Brazil and Kirk (2016) study the effect of Uber on populous U.S. counties.  
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cab access is not novel, only heterogeneously distributed (Grynbaum 2011, Wellington 2014). 
This study borrows from the literature on transit choice, which typically weighs public 
transportation options (train, bus, subway) against driving as a joint decision with housing 
choice; Uber constitutes an additional transit option that is particularly suited to circumstances 
when an individual requires transportation while intoxicated. According to Hall, Palsson, and 
Price’s (2017) study on Uber’s substitution effects, ride-hailing’s arrival in large cities increases 
public transit ridership but it decreases transit ridership for transit systems with high ridership 
levels. This combination of effects further supports the argument that New York consumers 
usually take public transit, but rely on ride-hailing for trips with specific characteristics, like 
household emergencies or trips back from parties, bars, or restaurants after indulging in alcoholic 
beverages.   
 
1. Mechanism 
Uber’s New York City launch in May 2011 marked the introduction of a new transportation 
mode that has a different collection of characteristics than the other available modes. In the 
context of McFadden’s discrete choice models for transit demand, Uber represents a reduction in 
potential waiting times for customers, and a potential reduction in the cost of rides over 
medallion taxis.9 Uber is also characteristically easier to use than cabs, buses, and subways for 
trips whose purpose is alcohol consumption or whose timeframe is late at night. McFadden 
characterizes urban travel demand as a derived demand stemming from the destination and 
purpose of the trip, implying that consumers who value Uber’s transit characteristics more highly 
will substitute to Uber rides from other transit modes after the introduction of the service in order 
                                                
9 See McFadden (1975), Chapter 3 for a framework for consumer choice behavior applied to travel demand. 
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to fulfill their trip needs (McFadden 1974, pp. 304). I do not examine the consumer’s long-run 
decisions regarding travel demand and transit mode (residential location or automobile 
ownership) that might result from the Uber launch in New York City, but rather examine the 
short-run effect on drunk-driving outcomes given Uber access. 
A few mechanics of the Uber service allow for varying wait times and prices relative to 
medallion taxis. The New York Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) caps the number of 
medallion street-hail taxis in New York City, but does not restrict the number of Uber drivers, 
allowing for an increase in Uber drivers to meet short-term demand spikes. Medallion taxi 
drivers must adhere to posted prices set by the TLC and may not adjust prices based on an 
observed increase in the quantity of cab rides demanded. In contrast, Uber ride prices may 
fluctuate from day to day or hour to hour. Analysis of medallion taxi trip data has verified the 
large dip in taxi supply at the 5 o’clock PM taxi shift change. Medallion taxi drivers transfer their 
cabs to the next driver at the same hour that potential riders begin to leave work. Uber has taken 
steps to recruit off-duty drivers at peak cab demand times using their pricing mechanism.10 
The health economics literature has not addressed a specific determinant of drunk driving: 
the cost of obtaining safe travel between locations, conditional on intoxication. If the taxi fares 
are fixed, wait time for a customer takes on the features of a price mechanism. As street-hail 
taxis are one of the few markets in the developed world where suppliers and consumers must 
physically search to find a match and complete a transaction, customers must wait longer for a 
ride at high customer-demand times rather than paying higher prices (Flechette, Lizzeri, and 
Saltz, 2016). A smartphone app-hail system may thus increase the information that both driver 
and passenger have about the location of potential transaction partners. This increase in 
                                                
10 See Cramer and Kruger (2016) on surge pricing and the efficiency of Uber in the context of the taxi market. 
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information decreases search frictions by reducing wait times and the effort required to secure a 
ride for customers.  
In addition to the cost measured in wait time, Uber may also address the increased difficulty 
of cognitive functions after drinking. Navigation, uncertainty, and mathematical calculation of 
monetary cost or tip may be more unpleasant or difficult when intoxicated. A rider may summon 
an Uber ride to her physical location using GPS rather than navigating an unknown 
neighborhood to hail a cab or communicating on the phone with a cab dispatcher using a street 
address. Updates on the GPS location of her driver may be a valuable assurance that a cab has 
actually been dispatched, unlike the experience with phone-dispatched or street-hail taxis. The 
rider also need not retain enough cash for a ride home through Uber or calculate a tip. In this 
context, the May 2011 Uber launch marks the beginning of a period of differentially-lower ride 
costs for intoxicated consumers in terms of price, wait time, and ease-of-use relative to 
conventional taxis.  
 
2. Data 
Data on all alcohol-related crashes in New York State are available from the New York 
State Department of Motor Vehicles (NYS-DMV) and Department of Transportation (NYS-
DOT).11 For my analysis, I use data from all alcohol-related motor vehicle collisions that 
occurred from January 2007 through July 2013. This sample does not omit collisions involving 
motorcycles or commercial vehicles, in part because it would be difficult to assign fault reliably 
or determine whether a commercial vehicle or motorcycle trip were substitutable for an Uber 
                                                
11 The data set obtained from NYS-DMV for this study spans January 1989 through December 2013. For my 
analysis, I trim the data to a historically relevant period around the entrance of Uber in New York City.  
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ride.12 This period includes Uber’s entrance into the New York market in May 2011, allows for a 
substantial pre-treatment period, and omits two potentially confounding entrances in the New 
York City transportation market that could influence the alcohol-related collision rate. The first 
entrance occurred in August 2013 as New York City introduced a new form of taxi medallion to 
serve only the “outer boroughs” of Brooklyn, Queens, the Bronx, Staten Island, and northern 
Manhattan. These “boro” taxis were painted green rather than the typical yellow of medallion 
taxis, and were banned from picking up passengers in lower Manhattan, where most street-hail 
yellow taxi rides originate. The second entrance occurred in July 2013 as Uber launched 
coverage in the Hamptons (Suffolk County) for summer weekends only with a publicity stunt 
offering helicopter rides from New York City to the Hamptons. Omitting Suffolk County from 
the analysis does not significantly change the results, supporting the suspicion that this initial 
launch was slow to provide significant coverage and did not do so in July 2013.  
A collision’s inclusion in the NYS-DMV alcohol-related subsample implies a police 
officer determined that alcohol was one of the causes of the collision. Each record contains 
detailed information about the logistics of the collision, including the jurisdiction, but no 
personal information about the drivers (or passengers, pedestrians, and cyclists) involved. I 
transform the collision-level data into monthly alcohol-related collision counts by county. 
County-level aggregates and monthly frequency is preferred since the Uber launch in this study 
occurs at the county level (rather than state or neighborhood) in May 2011. The full estimation 
                                                
12 A small number of commercial and livery vehicles are included in the crash data. Since there is no way to 
determine fault in the data, omitting commercial vehicle crashes involving 2 or more vehicles would risk omitting 
legitimate civilian drunk-driving collisions. The collisions that are more concerning are those comprised of single-
vehicle alcohol-related livery collisions that exist in the data. Omitting these observations might risk omitting 
crashes incorrectly marked as livery vehicles. I have replicated the results in this study without these single-car 
livery collisions, and the results hold. The change in the coefficient estimate is on the order of 0.01 on a coefficient 
estimate of -2.42 in the preferred specification.  
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sample contains 4,526 observations of monthly data in 62 New York State counties, five of 
which are New York City boroughs, from January 2007 through July 2013.  
In this study, I use alcohol-related collision counts to measure the effect of Uber’s 
introduction on drunk driving. Other studies have used alcohol-related automobile fatalities from 
the publicly available FARS (Fatal Accident Reporting System) dataset, which includes 
information on alcohol involvement.13 The set of all fatal, alcohol-related collisions is a subset of 
all alcohol-related collisions in New York State. Using the larger set of alcohol-related collisions 
provides enough observations to estimate effects using county aggregates at a monthly 
frequency.  
While the NYS-DMV data contains information about the location of the collision, it 
does not contain information about the home addresses of people involved in the collisions (nor 
does FARS). In this study, I make inferences linking the car-owning population of a county and 
the number of collisions in that county. It may be that the driver in a collision is not a resident of 
the county in which they collided. I do not make this distinction for statistical purposes: random 
measurement error in the dependent variable does not bias the estimates of the treatment effect. 
This study’s result may have implications for state and local government, however, so I 
emphasize that the outcome variable is alcohol-related collisions in a county scaled by the 
number of resident vehicles in that county. I do not imply that local governments’ choice to let 
Uber operate directly reduces the health outcomes of taxpayers residing in that locality; rather I 
observe the frequency of collisions occurring in counties where Uber does and does not operate. 
                                                
13 For examples of studies that use FARS to examine policy changes, see Dee (2001), Benson and Ramussen (1999), 
Chaloupka, Saffer, and Grossman (1993), or Lovenheim and Slemrod (2010). Other authors in this research area 
have produced their own fatal collisions data by state for within-state county-level comparative case studies, as in 
Baughman (2001). 
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This assumed connection between drivers and county populations is made similarly or left 
unaddressed in most of the drunk-driving literature. 
To gauge the potential for collisions, I use information on yearly counts of registered 
vehicles by county, provided by the NYS-DMV. These registration counts are broken into 
subgroups by vehicle type and I use only the standard automobile registrations (rather than taxis, 
heavy trucks, farm equipment, or motorcycles). Using registration counts to form county 
alcohol-related collision rates (as alcohol-related collisions per 100,000 registered vehicles) 
produces an outcome variable that is less driven by the large differences in population between 
counties in New York State. This vehicle-based measure is also more pertinent to the public 
health of drivers than the public health of all residents, who may travel only by subway or train.14  
While unsuited to my drunk-driving outcome variable, resident population can be used to 
form a county population density measure to indicate highly-urban counties. The New York 
State Department of Labor publishes population statistics and land area in square miles at the 
county level, which I use to calculate monthly state population and monthly state population 
density by linear interpolation.  
Finally, the popular press has reported on the entrance of non-medallion taxi companies 
like Uber in major cities in the United States and Uber produces press releases before most 
expansions into new territory on its website. From these articles, blog posts, and press-releases 
describing the transit markets in New York City, I have constructed a timeline to determine when 
Uber entered the New York City market, and when similar services launched that might 
potentially confound the estimation of an Uber effect on drunk driving.  
                                                
14 I omit livery and commercial vehicles from the vehicle counts I use in the denominator of the dependent variable. 
Commercial and livery vehicles are not theoretically justified in the “population at risk" of drunk driving who might 
switch to a ride-hailed ride instead. Professional drivers’ alcohol consumption and drunk driving in the course of a 
work trip, rather than a leisure trip, is the result of a different data generating process.  
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I use alcohol-related collisions per 100,000 standard vehicles rather than per 100,000 
residents in this study to correctly frame the public health question, because relatively few New 
York City residents are car owners and drivers. For example, in 2010 the Bronx, Brooklyn, 
Queens, and Manhattan had a combined 7,623,628 residents, but only 3,052,853 standard vehicle 
driver’s licenses and 1,518,763 standard car registrations (see Appendix 1 for summary statistics 
by county). I also use this measure because it varies less among New York State counties than 
the per-capita measure. To see the wide variation in alcohol-related collisions in levels, Figure 1 
presents a shaded map of New York State. Variation in per capita collisions, like variation in 
collision levels, would reflect only the great differences between New York City and non-New-
York-City counties’ populations. Figure 2 shows the registration-based collision rate, with many 
New York State counties displaying a similar shade to New York City.  
 
3. Difference-in-Differences Estimation 
To estimate the effect of Uber on drunk driving, I designate some New York State 
counties as treated by the intervention and others as members of the untreated control group. 
Based on newspaper articles and press releases, this study considers the Bronx, Brooklyn, 
Queens and Manhattan as treated, but not Staten Island (Richmond County). In the earliest data 
period that is available, Staten Island’s Uber pickup count was an order of magnitude smaller the 
other New York City boroughs. Table 1 contains summary statistics from the Uber dataset that 
highlight this disparity in pickups between Staten Island and the rest of the New York City 
boroughs. Corroborating the impression that Uber operated at much lower volume on Staten 
Island than elsewhere in New York City, Uber launched a publicized expansion campaign in the 
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summer of 2015, including driver incentives to attempt an increase in coverage on Staten 
Island.15  
Figure 3 plots treated versus untreated New York State counties over time. The treated 
series is the average alcohol-related collision rate for treated New York City counties, omitting 
Staten Island. The untreated series is the average alcohol-related collision rate of all other New 
York State counties. The introduction of Uber in May 2011 is indicated with a black vertical line. 
While the noisiness of the data makes it difficult to visually distinguish small trends, there is a 
divergence in these two series in the post-May-2011 period.  
Figure 4 plots each of the treated counties’ alcohol-related collision rates individually 
over time. Each county shows a large drop in its alcohol-related collision rate after the 
introduction of Uber, but it is also apparent that the four counties’ alcohol-related collision rates 
converge over time. This may reflect the proportion of the population with a lower reserve price 
than the Uber price, or it may reflect some stable proportion of the population that eschews 
public transit when intoxicated regardless of price or mode characteristics.  
Identification of the estimated intent-to-treat effect relies on variation in Uber access before 
and after the Uber launch in May 2011, between counties where Uber service was substantial and 
the counties where it was not. This analysis uses only New York State counties as potential 
control counties for the New York City boroughs. New York State introduced a state-wide law to 
target repeat offenders of drunk driving in September 2012. This law made it more difficult for 
violators with multiple drunk-driving offenses to relicense after their driver’s licenses were 
                                                
15 For news coverage of Uber’s incentives in July 2015, see “Uber Expands Staten Island Service Driver Incentives,” 
most recently downloaded from http://www.ny1.com/nyc/staten-island/news/2015/07/28/uber-expands-staten-
island-service-using-driver-incentives.html on September 17, 2017. 
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revoked.16 Because the new law came into effect in all New York State counties simultaneously, 
I use New York counties outside of New York City, rather than counties in Connecticut or New 
Jersey, as part of a control group to help identify the effect of the Uber launch.  
The difference-in-differences estimates are produced using four different control group 
specifications based on different criteria exogenous to the intervention. For the first control 
group, I use all possible control counties to minimize information loss. This specification 
includes all 58 New York State counties that are not part of the treatment group. Not all counties 
in the control group may be good counterfactuals for New York City counties, however, and this 
specification may inflate the treatment effect based on fundamental differences between counties 
that vary over time rather than the effect of the intervention. Motivated by this concern, I form 
three additional control groups for comparison. For the second control group, I select the ten 
New York State counties that are geographically close to New York City. Counties that are 
physically close together may share common population characteristics and common trends in 
drunk-driving behavior. These counties are within the feasible commuting radius of New York 
City, and many share common behaviors as members of the same metropolitan area. Third, I 
select the ten most densely populated New York State counties using 2006 census data. Urban 
centers may differ from rural areas in terms of road conditions, traffic levels, and behavioral 
norms of alcohol consumption. New York City’s counties (boroughs) are the most densely 
populated in the state, and this density-based specification is motivated by the differences 
between the state’s urban communities and rural communities that may be poor counterfactuals 
for each other despite their similar laws and climate. Fourth, I select counties based on average 
                                                
16 See this summary of the changes to New York State Vehicle and Traffic Laws from the Office of the Governor of 
New York: https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-regulations-protect-new-yorkers-
dangerous-drivers last seen October 25, 2017. 
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alcohol-related collision rates from 2009 and 2010. The four treated New York City boroughs 
are evenly spaced throughout the distribution of county-average drunk-driving rates for this 
period. To create the control group in this specification, I select eight total counties: the counties 
with the closest value above and below each treated county’s alcohol-related collision rate 
value.17  
Using these four control group specifications, I estimate the following difference-in-
differences model, where the unit of analysis is county-month.  𝐶𝑅#$ = 𝛼 + 𝑋$)𝛽 + 𝑇#)𝛾 + 𝛿 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡#	×	𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑$ + 𝜖#$ (1) 
CR is an alcohol-related collision rate constructed using county-level registered vehicle 
counts within a given month, X is a vector of county fixed effects that control for time-invariant 
differences between counties, T is a vector of month-year fixed effects that control for common 
variation over time across all counties (e.g.: a harsh winter, a state-wide recession, or a state-
wide change in alcohol control laws), and the variable of interest is the product of a treated 
county indicator (Treated) and a time indicator equal to one after the Uber launch in May 2011 
(Post).  
 
4. Difference-in-Differences Results 
In Table 2, I present results from difference-in-differences estimation. Each column contains 
an estimate of the effect of Uber access on the alcohol-related collision rate, clustered standard 
errors in parentheses, and wild-bootstrap county-clustered standard errors in brackets.18 These 
                                                
17 I did not pursue a cohort of cities approach as in Card (1997). Gathering monthly-frequency data for each city 
would require a separate Freedom of Information Act request that would have taken prohibitively long. 
18 Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) introduce wild bootstrap standard errors to address within-cluster 
dependence, which becomes particularly important with data that has few clusters. One iteration of the wild 
bootstrap procedure reforms the dependent variable by multiplying each cluster of residuals by 1 or -1 and adding 
the resulting residual values to the fitted value. While 62 New York State counties are examined in this study, in 
some specifications eight control counties are compared to four treatment counties. My cluster total of twelve 
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results are presented with and without county-specific time trends for each control-group 
specification. The magnitude of the estimates is consistent across specifications, as is the size of 
the standard errors. Scaled by the mean of the dependent variable, the effect represents an 
average decrease in the alcohol-related collision rate of 17 to 35 percent for the treated counties 
taken as a group. The estimates from specifications two through four restrict the control group to 
more comparable counties, and show a 25 to 35 percent decrease in the alcohol-related collision 
rate.   
To check the robustness of these results, Table 3 presents a placebo test using June 2009, the 
midpoint of the pre-period, as a placebo intervention date instead of May 2011, the observed 
intervention date. This new pre-intervention period begins in July 2007 and ends in April 2009. 
The estimated effects of the placebo intervention differ strongly from the actual intervention 
results in Table 2, producing effects with much smaller magnitudes, most of which are positively 
signed. None of the effects are significant at the 1 percent level though some are significant at 
the 5 percent level, and the inclusion of county-specific time trends causes changes in sign, 
magnitude, and significance. This difference between the main results in Table 2 and the placebo 
results in Table 3 suggests that the estimated treatment effects in Table 2 are not easily 
reproducible by chance.  
To help put the estimated effects of the Uber launch from Table 2 in context, Table 4 scales 
the treatment effect by the 2010 registered vehicle count and the 2010 average monthly crash 
count in each treated county. This table shows that if the average effect were apportioned across 
the four treated counties by their population of vehicles, it would imply a crash count decrease in 
                                                
approaches the “ten or less” threshold where Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller show incorrect standard errors from 
other methods. I use Graham, Arai, and Hagströmer’s R package, “multiwaycov” which can be accessed here: 
http://sites.google.com/site/npgraham1/research/code last seen October 13, 2017. 
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Queens of 16 to 22 crashes per month, a 33 to 45 percent decrease from Queens’ 2010 average 
monthly alcohol-related crash count. On the lower end of the spectrum, these average effects 
imply 5 to 7 fewer crashes per month in Manhattan, a 16 to 22 percent decrease based on 
Manhattan’s 2010 average alcohol-related crash count. While the transformed estimates in Table 
4 are perhaps easier to interpret, it is unrealistic to expect the introduction of a new transit mode 
to produce uniformly distributed effects over the population of vehicles in a city.   
To examine heterogeneity in the Uber-access effect on drunk driving in each New York City 
borough, Table 5 presents the same OLS difference-in-differences estimation, but with separate 
treatment effects for each treated county using the following estimating equation. 𝐶𝑅#$ = 𝛼 + 𝑋$)𝛽 + 𝑇#)𝛾 + 𝛿(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡#×𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑥$) + 𝜁(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡#×𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑙𝑦𝑛$)+ 𝜂(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡#×𝑄𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑠$) + 𝜃(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡#×𝑀𝑎𝑛ℎ𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛$) + 𝜖#$ (2) 
Allowing for separate treatment effects for each treated county, I find that the magnitude of 
the effect for Manhattan is much larger than the average effects in Table 2. Instead of a collision-
rate effect between -2.5 and -3.3 as in Table 2, Manhattan’s separate treatment effect ranges 
between -3.5 and -4.3 when county-specific time trends are included. The separate treatment 
effect for Queens is much smaller than the New York City average treatment effect, with a 
change in collision rate ranging between -1.9 and -2.7 when county-specific time trends are 
included. Both Brooklyn and the Bronx show middling treatment effects close to the New York 
City average effect. An F test of equality between these differentiated treatment effect 
coefficients finds that most of them are significantly different from each other in the 
specifications with more comparable control counties.19 Rather than filling in areas with limited 
                                                
19 The p values from these F tests are presented in Appendix Table 2.1. In specifications 2, 3, and 4, Manhattan’s 
treatment coefficient is significantly different from Queens’ treatment coefficient and Queens’ treatment coefficient 
is significantly different from Brooklyn’s treatment coefficient at the 1 percent level. In specification 2 and 3, 
Queens’ treatment coefficient is also different from the treatment effect for both Brooklyn and the Bronx at the 1 
percent level. In specification 4, Queens’ treatment coefficient is significantly different from Brooklyn’s treatment 
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access to public-transit, this range of effects suggests the Uber launch served as an additional 
mode to access the established urban center.  
Just as I estimated separate treatment effects for each New York City borough to highlight 
the heterogeneity of treatment effects across space, I estimate separate treatment effects over 
time. Table 6 presents difference-in-differences estimates for treatment effects that may vary 
each year after the intervention.20 This method shows smaller effects immediately following the 
Uber launch and larger effects in the later years of the sample period. Compared to the average 
alcohol-related crash rate effect of -2.5 from Table 2 using the population-dense control group, 
the separate time effect estimation shows a -1.48 change in the crash rate for the first year after 
the Uber launch, a -3.9 change in the crash rate for year two, and a -3.27 change in the crash rate 
for year three. This small effect in the first calendar year is robust across control group 
specifications and may be explained by low salience immediately after the Uber launch, low 
consumer trust for non-medallion taxi services, or the dynamics of Uber’s fleet size through 
driver acquisition.  
 
5. Synthetic Control Analysis 
The analysis above establishes that there was a large, negative effect of Uber’s New York 
City launch on alcohol-related collisions. As a further robustness check and to explore the 
                                                
coefficient at the 5 percent level. From the results of this table I conclude that there were significant differences 
between the experiences of some of the treated counties in this study, though perhaps not distinct differences 
between all four treated counties separately.  
20 I have borrowed the methodology from Wolfers’ (2006) study on unilateral divorce laws. Because my pre-period 
is shorter than in Wolfers (2006), instead of 2-year indicators I use a binary indicator for each post-treatment 
calendar year available in this study: 2011, 2012, and 2013.   
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dynamics of county-by-county effects, I employ a synthetic control analysis and examine each 
treated borough separately.21 
Synthetic control methods may improve upon standard difference-in-differences analysis in 
identifying a control group that more closely resembles the treatment group in the pre-treatment 
period, providing a more plausible counterfactual. The time series plot of automobile collisions 
is noisier than the time series typically used in synthetic control analyses, making it difficult to 
achieve a reasonable fit between the treated group and the synthetic control in the pre-treatment 
period.22 To help select control units based on signal rather than noise, I run the synthetic control 
optimization process on a 3-month moving average of the original series.  
For each of the four treated boroughs in New York City, all of the 58 untreated counties 
serve as members of the donor pool. Each synthetic comparison county I produce is the strictly-
positively-weighted sum of some combination of counties from the donor pool. The non-
negative, mean-squared-error-minimizing county weights that produce each synthetic control 
series are provided in Appendix 3. I use only the pre-intervention alcohol-related collision rate 
values to construct the synthetic control weights. 
Figure 5 shows the synthetic control gap plots for each treated county, with a vertical line to 
mark the May 2011 launch of Uber in New York City. The largest effect over time appears to be 
in Brooklyn (Kings County), though all the treated boroughs show significant divergence from 
their synthetic control, suggesting an increase in Uber fleets and New York City’s ride-hailing 
learning curve. 
                                                
21 Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller’s (2010) synthetic control method selects a weighted average of several 
potential control units based on pre-treatment variables for use in difference-in-differences estimation. This method 
is deployed in this study using Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller’s R package “Synth,” available at https://cran.r-
project.org/web/packages/Synth/Synth.pdf last seen October 13, 2017. 
22 Cigarette sales per capita in Abadie et al. (2010) and GDP per capita in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) are 
significantly smoother. 
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As a robustness check, I implement the synthetic control method using Staten Island 
(Richmond County), a similar but untreated county, to produce a placebo synthetic control gap 
plot. Staten Island is a borough of New York City, but access to Uber was minimal even years 
after New York City’s Uber launch (see Table 1 for a comparison of 2014 Uber pickups by 
county). In Figure 6, the gap plot does not show the same decrease as the plots in Figure 5. This 
lack of effect in Figure 5 is further evidence that the Uber intervention in New York City is not 
easily replicated by chance. It is possible that the lack of effect in the Staten Island plot, 
however, is a product of a poorly-fit synthetic control unit since the pre-period gap plot varies 
widely from the zero line. 
For a more rigorous robustness check of the synthetic control results, I follow Abadie et al. 
(2010) and perform a permutation test. Producing a synthetic control gap plot for each of the 62 
New York State counties approximates the distribution of potential county effects. It allows for a 
visual inspection of whether the New York City treatment counties’ gap plots are extreme events 
in the distribution of all county gap plots with a May 2011 intervention date. The number of gap 
plots that appear more negative than the treated-county gap plot divided by the sample size 
should approximate the power of the test in typical statistical inference. If each treated-county 
plot is not more extreme than 95 to 99 percent of the untreated-county plots in the plot 
distribution, it might indicate that the estimated treatment effect is not statistically significant.  
Figure 7 shows all 62 synthetic control gap plots, one for each New York State county. The 
treated-county plots (Manhattan, Brooklyn, the Bronx, and Queens) are shown in black and the 
untreated-county plots shown in gray. All synthetic control gap plots are constructed from 3-
month moving averages of the original series to reduce the probability of optimizing on noise 
rather than central tendency. I present all 62 plots in Figure 7 for completeness but my analysis is 
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based on Figure 8 and 9, both of which omit counties with high mean squared prediction errors 
(MSPE) in the pre-period. If a synthetic control series fits the original county series poorly in the 
pre-period, it is likely that the post-intervention effects stem from poor fit not a measured effect. 
I seek to compare the treated-county plots to a distribution of similarly well-constructed control-
county plots. In this spirit, I omit control-county plots with very large MSPEs. I do this in two 
waves based on MSPE cutoffs that are multiples of the treatment county MSPEs.  
Figure 8 omits any county with a MSPE greater than 20 times Queens County’s MSPE. Each 
comparison graph contains 37 control counties from the original 58, with treated counties plotted 
in black. With a sample of 38 and a 5 percent test level, traditional statistical inference would 
indicate that 2 extreme value plots might be expected to occur randomly. While none of the 
treated counties are the extreme outliers in this distribution, the treated counties as a group are 
collectively more extreme than all but one or two of the control plots.  
Figure 9 omits any county with a MSPE greater than 8 times Queens’ MSPE for a stricter 
level of comparability.23 It contains 20 control county plots out of the original 58, a total sample 
size of 21, including any single treated county. This sample size suggests that at a 5 percent 
level, one of the plots might be expected to occur at random. At this level of fit, all of the treated-
county gap plots appear visually more extreme than the rest of the distribution.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Uber’s launch in New York City produced a natural experiment, allowing me to estimate the 
effect of Uber access on alcohol-related collisions as a proxy for drunk driving, using unaffected 
New York State counties as a control group. Using difference-in-differences estimation I find 
                                                
23 I use a factor of 8 rather than 5 as in Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller’s (2010), because any smaller multiplier 
would leave a sample size smaller than 20 which would be too small for inference at a 5 percent level.  
 24 
that the introduction of Uber decreased the alcohol-related collision rate by 25 to 35 percent in 
the affected counties. I decompose this effect for each of four New York City counties that 
experienced significant Uber access using difference-in-differences and synthetic controls 
methodology. I find that Manhattan, where public transit and cabs were already plentiful, has the 
largest effect. To determine if this effect was sustained, I decompose the treatment effect over 
time and find that the effect of the intervention increased over time before tapering off. Synthetic 
control analysis shows a significant dynamic decrease in alcohol-related collisions in all four 
treated boroughs. A permutation test on the synthetic control results, other robustness checks, 
and placebo tests, suggest these results were not randomly produced.  
While non-medallion cab companies, including Uber, continue to spread to other cities, this 
study may provide some insight for municipalities’ transit decisions. It is vital to recall, however, 
that alcohol-related collision reductions of this magnitude are not necessarily generalizable to 
other cities, as New York City enjoyed many forms of public transit for a century before the 
Uber launch, unlike some other cities. New York City boasts a large population that does not 
own cars, which might encourage higher adoption rates of new transit options. Greenwood and 
Wattal (2016) and Dills and Mullholland (2017) examine the link between drunk driving and 
ride-hailing in some areas not traditionally known for a high degree of access to public 
transportation. They show smaller negative effects on traffic fatalities after Uber launches in 
California, and nationally.  
City governments seeking to reduce the cost of the alternative to drunk driving for city 
residents should examine the microdata on transit access in their cities, since the benefits of 
services like Uber will not necessarily accrue to all neighborhoods equally or optimally. Access 
to transportation services for intoxicated consumers is an important public-health concern and 
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allowing non-medallion cab services like Uber may help to target that goal. Without microdata 
on Uber’s pickups on Staten Island, generated from another author’s Freedom of Information Act 
request, Uber’s 2011 New York City launch would seem like evidence that Staten Island was 
“treated” with a significant increase in cab service. After the Uber launch, each of New York 
City’s boroughs experienced a different magnitude of effect and different dynamic effects over 
time, however, demonstrating that the experience of different neighborhoods within a 
metropolitan area may vary widely from the average effect for the entire area. The introduction 
of a service like Uber is not necessarily homogeneously distributed in a city, even years after its 
launch, and some areas, like Staten Island, may not have access at all.  
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Table 1: New York City Uber Pickups by Borough, 2014
Ride 
Count
Average 
Rides 
Per Day
Ride 
Count
Average 
Rides Per 
Month
Average 
Rides 
Per Day
Manhattan 453,547 15,118.2 3,443,456 573,909.3 18,920.1
Brooklyn 61,686 2,056.2 593,594 98,932.3 3,261.5
Queens 32,881 1,096.0 342,225 57,037.5 1,880.4
Bronx 3,023 100.8 31,584 5,264.0 173.5
Staten Island 121 4.0 1,034 172.3 5.7
April 2014 April - September 2014
Note:  this dataset was provided via a Freedom of Information Act request to the New York 
City Taxi and Limousine Commission from fivethirtyeight.com, available at 
https://github.com/fivethirtyeight/uber-tlc-foil-response, last seen September 17, 2017.
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Treatment -2.42 *** -3.30 *** -2.72 *** -3.32 ***
( 0.70 ) ( 0.52 ) ( 0.76 ) ( 0.51 )
[ 0.68 ] [ 0.50 ] [ 0.71 ] [ 0.47 ]
County Fixed Effects Y   Y   Y  Y  
County Time Trends Y   Y  
Dep. Var. Mean 14.08 14.08 9.47 9.47
Pct. Change -17.19 % -23.45 % -28.74 % -35.05 %
N 4526 4526 1022 1022
Adj. R Sq. 0.27 0.28 0.56 0.57
Treatment -3.08 *** -2.50 *** -2.77 *** -2.81 ***
( 0.75 ) ( 0.46 ) ( 0.89 ) ( 0.78 )
[ 0.66 ] [ 0.42 ] [ 0.81 ] [ 0.72 ]
County Fixed Effects Y  Y  Y  Y  
County Time Trends Y  Y  
Dep. Var. Mean 9.79 9.79 11.17 11.17
Pct. Change -31.46 % -25.50 % -24.80 % -25.14 %
N 1022 1022 876 876
Adj. R Sq. 0.69 0.71 0.33 0.33
Table 2: Difference-in-Differences OLS Estimates
Dependent Variable: Alcohol-Related Collisions per 
100,000 Registered Vehicles by County
Note:  OLS difference-in-differences estimates of the ITT of Uber access on the alcohol-related 
collision rate comparing effect between treated counties (New York, Kings, Queens, Bronx) and 
control counties that differ in each specification. Specification (1) includes all New York counties. 
Specification (2) includes Richmond, Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester, Rockland, Dutchess, Orange, 
Putnam, Ulster and Sullivan as control counties that are physically near the treated counties. 
Specification (3) includes Richmond, Nassau, Suffolk, Rockland, Westchester, Monroe, Erie, 
Schenectady, Onondaga, and Albany as control counties with similar population density to the 
treated counties. Specification (4) includes Nassau, Rockland, Schenectady, Niagara, Onondaga, 
Yates, Delaware, and Broome as control counties with similar pre-period alcohol-related collision 
rates to the treated counties. County-level clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
County-level clustered wild-bootstrap standard errors using Rademacher weights are reported in 
brackets. All specifications include county and month-year fixed effects. Significance levels are 
indicated by * <0.10, ** <0.05, *** <0.01. The second column in each section introduces county-
specific time trends to check whether the treatment effect is driven primarily by differences in pre-
existing county-level trends. 
(2)
Full Data Set
Matching on Geographic 
Proximity
Matching on Pre-Period 
Population Density
Matching on Pre-Period 
Dependent Variable
(3) (4)
(1)
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Table 3: Placebo Difference-in-Differences OLS Estimates (2009-2013 Sample)
Treatment 0.17 -1.47 ** 0.35 -0.85
( 0.66 ) ( 0.68 ) ( 0.60 ) ( 0.65 )
[ 0.38 ] [ 0.65 ] [ 0.55 ] [ 0.61 ]
County Fixed Effects Y   Y  Y  Y  
County Time Trends Y  Y  
Dep. Var. Mean 14.70 14.70 10.20 10.20
Pct. Change 1.16 % -10.00 % 3.43 % -8.33 %
N 2852 2852 644 644
Adj. R Sq. 0.27 0.28 0.58 0.59
Treatment -0.35 -0.64 -0.17 -1.26 *
( 0.52 ) ( 0.46 ) ( 0.57 ) ( 0.76 )
[ 0.48 ] [ 0.59 ] [ 0.50 ] [ 0.72 ]
County Fixed Effects Y  Y  Y  Y  
County Time Trends Y  Y  
Dep. Var. Mean 10.43 10.43 11.94 11.94
Pct. Change -3.36 % -6.14 % -1.42 % -10.55 %
N 644 644 552 552
Adj. R Sq. 0.69 0.69 0.30 0.29
Matching on Pre-Period 
Population Density
Matching on Pre-Period 
Dependent Variable
Dependent Variable: Alcohol-Related Collisions per 
100,000 Registered Vehicles by County
Note:  For a placebo treatment date of April 2010 (the midpoint of the hypothetical pre-
treatment period), OLS difference-in-differences estimates of the ITT effect of Uber access on 
the alcohol-related collision rate, comparing treated counties (New York, Kings, Queens, 
Bronx) and controls that differ in each specification. Specification (1) includes all New York 
counties. Specification (2) includes Richmond, Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester, Rockland, 
Dutchess, Orange, Putnam, Ulster and Sullivan as control counties that are physically near the 
treated counties. Specification (3) includes Richmond, Nassau, Suffolk, Rockland, 
Westchester, Monroe, Erie, Schenectady, Onondaga, and Albany as control counties with 
similar population density to the treated counties. Specification (4) includes Nassau, Rockland, 
Schenectady, Niagara, Onondaga, Yates, Delaware, and Broome as control counties with 
similar pre-period alcohol-related collision rates to the treated counties. Heteroskedastic-
consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Wild-bootstrap standard errors clustered 
at the county level using a Gaussian distribution for weighting are reported in brackets. All 
specifications include county and month-year fixed effects. Significance levels are indicated 
by * <0.10, ** <0.05, *** <0.01. The second column in each section introduces county-
specific time trends to check whether the treatment effect is driven primarily by differences in 
pre-existing county-level trends. 
Full Data Set
Matching on Geographic 
Proximity
(1) (2)
(3) (4)
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Table 6: Dynamic Treatment Estimates by Post-Intervention Year
Dependent Variable: Alcohol-Related Collision Rate
Treatment x Year 1 -1.04 -2.10 *** -1.17 * -2.08 ***
( 0.65 ) ( 0.51 ) ( 0.66 ) ( 0.47 )
Treatment x Year 2 -3.50 *** -4.96 *** -3.78 *** -5.03 ***
( 0.80 ) ( 0.73 ) ( 0.76 ) ( 0.68 )
Treatment x Year 3 -2.15 *** -3.99 *** -2.67 *** -4.24 ***
( 0.80 ) ( 0.76 ) ( 0.82 ) ( 0.73 )
County Time Trends Y  Y  
Dep. Var. Mean 14.08 14.08 9.47 9.47
N 4526 4526 1022 1022
Adj. R Sq. 0.27 0.28 0.56 0.58
Treatment x Year 1 -1.53 *** -1.48 *** -0.76 -1.23
( 0.60 ) (0.42 ) ( 1.00 ) ( 0.82 )
Treatment x Year 2 -3.96 *** -3.90 *** -4.30 *** -4.96 ***
( 0.79 ) ( 0.59 ) ( 1.01 ) ( 0.82 )
Treatment x Year 3 -3.36 *** -3.27 *** -2.45 *** -3.28 ***
( 0.83 ) ( 0.68 ) ( 0.98 ) ( 0.89 )
County Time Trends Y  Y  
Dep. Var. Mean 9.79 9.79 11.17 11.17
N 1022 1022 876 876
Adj. R Sq. 0.70 0.71 0.33 0.34
(1) (2)
Note:  OLS difference-in-difference estimates of the ITT effect of Uber access on the alcohol-related collision 
rate, comparing treated counties (New York, Kings, Queens, Bronx) and control counties that differ in each 
specification. Specification (1) includes all New York counties. Specification (2) includes Richmond, Nassau, 
Suffolk, Westchester, Rockland, Dutchess, Orange, Putnam, Ulster and Sullivan as control counties. 
Specification (3) includes Richmond, Nassau, Suffolk, Rockland, Westchester, Monroe, Erie, Schenectady, 
Onondaga, and Albany as control counties. Specification (4) includes Nassau, Rockland, Schenectady, 
Niagara, Onondaga, Yates, Delaware, and Broome as control counties. County-level clustered wild-bootstrap 
standard errors using Rademacher weights are reported in parentheses. All specifications include county and 
month-year fixed effects. Significance levels are indicated by * <0.10, ** <0.05, *** <0.01. The second 
column in each section introduces county-specific time trends to check whether the treatment effect is driven 
primarily by differences in pre-existing county-level trends. Each treatment indicator represents the treatment 
effect within a calendar year (2011, 2012, or 2013). This set of indicator variables may be represented as the 
product of the treatment group indicator (equal to one for each treated count), the treatment period indicator 
(equal to one after Uber launched in New York), and a calendar year indicator (equal to one for all 
observations in 2011, for example). 
Difference-in-Differences OLS Estimates of Dynamic Treatment Effects For Year 1-3
Matching on Geographic 
ProximityFull Data Set
Matching on Pre-Period 
Population Density
Matching on Pre-Period 
Dependent Variable
(3) (4)
 32 
 
Figure 1: Chloropleth Map of New York State Alcohol-Related Collisions  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Chloropleth Map of New York State Alcohol-Related Collisions Rate  
 
 33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Months
Cr
ash
 R
ate
Treated
Untreated
Figure 3: Treated vs Untreated Counties 
Alcohol−Related Crash Rate
0
5
10
15
20
25
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Months
Cr
ash
 R
ate
Bronx
Brooklyn
Manhattan
Queens
Figure 4: Treated Counties 
Alcohol−Related Crash Rate
 34 
Figure 5: Synthetic Control Gap Plots for Four Treated New York Counties 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Placebo Synthetic Control Plot for Staten Island (Richmond County) 
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Figure 7: Synthetic Control Permutation Test 
All Potential Donor Counties (Gray) and Treated Counties (Black) 
Synthetic Control Gap Plot Series (3-Month Moving Average) 
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Figure 8: Synthetic Control Permutation Test  
Includes Donor County Series < 20 Times Smallest Treated County MSPE (Gray) 
and Treated Counties (Black) 
Synthetic Control Gap Plot Series (3-Month Moving Average) 
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Figure 9: Synthetic Control Permutation Test  
Includes Donor County Series < 8 Times Smallest Treated County MSPE (Gray) 
and Treated Counties (Black) 
Synthetic Control Gap Plot Series (3-Month Moving Average) 
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Appendix 1
 
County
Albany 312 304,198 199,754 180,161 14.4 13.0 8.5 568.5 581.1
Allegany 75 48,971 32,612 26,489 23.6 19.2 12.8 48.8 47.5
Bronx 345 1,387,754 422,752 227,585 12.6 6.8 2.1 32,395.2 33,018.2
Broome 220 200,388 140,757 126,471 14.5 13.0 9.1 277.7 283.5
Cattaraugus 88 80,223 56,647 46,149 15.9 12.9 9.1 62.3 61.2
Cayuga 93 79,874 55,031 46,069 16.8 14.1 9.7 117.2 115.2
Chautauqua 158 134,837 93,784 78,326 16.8 14.1 9.8 127.5 127.0
Chemung 95 88,935 61,341 54,861 14.4 12.9 8.9 217.2 217.9
Chenango 62 50,364 38,256 33,133 15.6 13.5 10.3 57.9 56.3
Clinton 81 82,075 56,498 50,632 13.3 11.9 8.2 79.1 79.0
Columbia 58 62,978 47,740 45,701 10.6 10.1 7.7 99.0 99.1
Cortland 66 49,299 32,279 27,445 20.0 17.0 11.2 97.0 98.7
Delaware 56 47,879 36,603 32,653 14.3 12.8 9.7 32.5 33.1
Dutchess 230 297,631 210,883 209,272 9.2 9.1 6.4 368.2 371.3
Erie 766 919,000 644,398 556,969 11.5 9.9 6.9 882.4 880.1
Essex 66 39,335 28,503 24,108 22.8 19.3 14.0 21.5 21.9
Franklin 68 51,596 34,462 28,895 19.6 16.4 11.0 31.2 31.6
Fulton 65 55,446 39,967 35,077 15.4 13.5 9.8 111.7 111.7
Genesee 88 60,016 44,290 37,897 19.3 16.6 12.2 119.1 121.5
Greene 65 49,140 37,578 36,383 14.9 14.4 11.0 76.9 75.9
Hamilton 11 4,832 4,737 3,963 23.1 19.4 19.0 3.0 2.8
Herkimer 57 64,454 45,493 37,413 12.7 10.4 7.4 44.9 45.7
Jefferson 166 116,541 72,581 63,558 21.8 19.1 11.9 89.8 91.6
Kings 644 2,510,446 871,173 403,125 13.3 6.2 2.1 35,532.7 35,553.7
Lewis 36 27,066 19,965 15,537 19.3 15.0 11.1 20.9 21.2
Livingston 61 65,246 45,118 39,563 12.8 11.3 7.8 101.5 103.2
Madison 67 73,319 50,495 41,474 13.5 11.1 7.6 107.0 111.8
Monroe 694 744,732 511,386 469,361 12.3 11.3 7.8 1,108.5 1,129.6
Montgomery 76 50,213 35,607 31,766 19.9 17.8 12.6 121.3 124.0
Naussau 757 1,340,685 988,094 903,543 7.0 6.4 4.7 4,624.0 4,676.4
New York 398 1,589,999 715,332 220,959 15.0 4.6 2.1 70,179.4 69,250.8
Niagara 210 216,355 158,924 137,334 12.7 11.0 8.1 413.3 413.7
Oneida 220 234,756 160,751 137,102 13.4 11.4 7.8 192.9 193.6
Onondaga 452 467,178 321,041 281,335 13.4 11.7 8.1 585.4 598.7
Ontario 119 108,140 79,267 70,059 14.1 12.5 9.2 161.9 167.8
Orange 275 373,295 249,810 243,618 9.4 9.2 6.1 461.1 457.3
Orleans 58 42,853 29,562 25,421 19.0 16.4 11.3 110.4 109.5
Oswego 123 122,132 85,548 72,500 14.1 12.0 8.4 129.1 128.1
Otsego 80 62,211 43,770 37,879 17.6 15.2 10.7 62.4 62.0
Putnam 99 99,775 76,377 79,140 10.4 10.8 8.3 435.0 431.4
Queens 590 2,235,430 1,043,597 667,094 7.4 4.7 2.2 20,645.1 20,463.5
Rensselaer 163 159,350 110,614 99,912 13.6 12.3 8.5 237.5 243.7
Richmond 122 469,370 293,746 246,539 4.1 3.5 2.2 8,163.3 8,026.2
Rockland 205 312,262 204,759 193,015 8.8 8.3 5.5 1,693.1 1,792.3
Saratoga 235 219,930 168,428 155,134 12.6 11.6 8.9 265.4 270.9
Schenectady 140 154,774 114,962 105,223 11.1 10.1 7.5 729.9 751.0
Schoharie 33 32,679 24,080 22,238 12.4 11.4 8.4 51.8 52.5
Schuyler 25 18,334 14,020 12,189 17.1 14.9 11.4 59.1 55.8
Seneca 40 35,266 24,085 20,592 16.2 13.8 9.5 106.9 108.5
Steuben 118 111,929 74,696 60,706 16.2 13.2 8.8 41.4 41.7
St. Lawrence 129 98,973 71,976 61,444 17.5 14.9 10.9 70.5 71.1
Suffolk 1219 1,494,273 1,084,187 1,067,068 9.5 9.4 6.8 1,611.2 1,638.1
Sullivan 88 77,439 55,353 52,585 13.9 13.2 9.5 79.0 79.9
Tioga 67 51,056 38,387 33,471 16.7 14.6 10.9 98.9 98.4
Tompkins 119 101,728 62,338 51,875 19.1 15.9 9.7 210.9 213.7
Ulster 204 182,437 133,645 128,763 13.2 12.7 9.3 162.2 162.0
Warren 98 65,679 52,419 46,499 17.6 15.6 12.4 76.0 75.6
Washington 75 63,258 45,344 39,343 15.9 13.8 9.9 75.9 75.7
Wayne 93 93,671 69,549 62,367 12.4 11.1 8.3 153.7 155.0
Westchester 465 950,320 639,488 597,964 6.5 6.1 4.1 2,193.4 2,195.6
Wyoming 57 42,098 29,700 24,279 19.6 16.0 11.3 71.9 71.0
Yates 22 25,356 16,903 14,177 12.9 10.8 7.2 73.1 75.0
Note: Crash counts and rates for alcohol-related collisions Reported crash rates are constructed as alcohol-related collisions per 100,000 persons of the indicated group (i.e.: license-
holders). License holders and registered vehicles comprise standard automobile licenses and registration only (no heavy trucks, motorcycles, mopeds, farm equipment, or livery 
vehicles). 
Table 1.1 : 2010 New York Summary Statistics By County
Crash 
Count Population
Licensed 
Drivers
Registered 
Vehicles
Crash Rate 
(Registration)
Crash Rate 
(License)
Crash Rate 
(Population)
2006 
Population 
Density
2010 
Population 
Density
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Table 2.1: F  Tests on the Equality of Differentiated Treatment Coefficients
Manhattan Queens Brooklyn Manhattan Queens Brooklyn
Manhattan Manhattan
Queens 0.133 Queens < 0.001
Brooklyn 0.628 0.214 Brooklyn 0.140 < 0.001
Bronx 0.795 0.309 0.823 Bronx 0.427 < 0.001 0.495
Manhattan Queens Brooklyn Manhattan Queens Brooklyn
Manhattan Manhattan
Queens < 0.001 Queens 0.017
Brooklyn 0.248 0.003 Brooklyn 0.443 0.049
Bronx 0.534 0.015 0.593 Bronx 0.680 0.107 0.723
Note: p values on F  tests of equality between pairs of differentiated treatment coefficients from Table 5. The 
sections of this table indicate the four sets of control counties compared to the treated NYC boroughs. 
Specification (1) includes all New York counties. Specification (2) includes Richmond, Nassau, Suffolk, 
Westchester, Rockland, Dutchess, Orange, Putnam, Ulster and Sullivan as control counties that are physically 
near the treated counties. Specification (3) includes Richmond, Nassau, Suffolk, Rockland, Westchester, 
Monroe, Erie, Schenectady, Onondaga, and Albany as control counties with similar population density to the 
treated counties. Specification (4) includes Nassau, Rockland, Schenectady, Niagara, Onondaga, Yates, 
Delaware, and Broome as control counties with similar pre-period alcohol-related collision rates to the treated 
counties.
All Counties
(1) (3)
Nearby Counties
(2)
Pre-Period Crash Rate
(4)
Population-Density
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Appendix 4: Main Results Using Crash Counts as Dependent Variable 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Alcohol-Related Collision Count
Treatment -10.80 *** -10.82 *** -8.01 *** -10.75 ***
( 1.03 ) ( 1.99 ) ( 2.27 ) ( 2.84 )
[ 1.01 ] [ 1.89 ] [ 2.11 ] [ 2.56 ]
County Fixed Effects Y  Y  Y  Y  
Population of Vehicles Y  Y  Y  Y  
County Time Trends Y  Y  
Dep. Var. Mean 15.24 15.24 30.68 30.68
Pct. Change -17.20 % -23.50 % -28.70 % -35.10 %
N 4526 4526 1022 1022
Adj. R Sq. 0.93 0.93 0.90 0.91
Treatment -7.93 *** -8.41 *** -9.98 *** -10.54 ***
( 2.42 ) ( 2.78 ) ( 1.57 ) ( 1.98 )
[ 2.20 ] [ 2.46 ] [ 1.42 ] [ 1.77 ]
County Fixed Effects Y  Y  Y  Y  
Population of Vehicles Y  Y  Y  Y  
County Time Trends Y  Y  
Dep. Var. Mean 38.91 38.91 25.35 25.35
Pct. Change -31.50 % -25.50 % -24.80 % -25.10 %
N 1022 1022 876 876
Adj. R Sq. 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.89
Table 4.1: Difference-in-Differences OLS Estimates
Matching on Geographic 
ProximityFull Data Set
Matching on Pre-Period 
Population Density
Matching on Pre-Period Crash 
Rate
(4)(3)
Note: OLS difference-in-differences estimates of the ITT of Uber access on the alcohol-related collision counts, 
comparing  treated counties (New York, Kings, Queens, Bronx) and control counties that differ in each specification. 
Specification (1) includes all New York counties. Specification (2) includes Richmond, Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester, 
Rockland, Dutchess, Orange, Putnam, Ulster and Sullivan as control counties that are physically near the treated 
counties. Specification (3) includes Richmond, Nassau, Suffolk, Rockland, Westchester, Monroe, Erie, Schenectady, 
Onondaga, and Albany as control counties with similar population density to the treated counties. Specification (4) 
includes Nassau, Rockland, Schenectady, Niagara, Onondaga, Yates, Delaware, and Broome as control counties with 
similar pre-period alcohol-related collision rates to the treated counties. County-level clustered standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. County-level clustered wild-bootstrap standard errors using Rademacher weights are reported 
in brackets. All specifications include county and month-year fixed effects. Significance levels are indicated by * 
<0.10, ** <0.05, *** <0.01. The second column in each section introduces county-specific time trends to check 
whether the treatment effect is driven primarily by differences in pre-existing county-level trends. 
(1) (2)
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Figure 4.1: Synthetic Control Gap Plots 
Alcohol-Related Crash Counts (3-Month Moving Average) 
 
 
 
 
Note: synthetic control gap plots represent the difference between the observed, treated, New York City counties and 
their synthetic control counterparts. These plots use a 3-month moving average of alcohol-related crash counts by 
county at monthly frequency using the same methodology as the synthetic control plots of the alcohol-related 
collision rates presented in the body of this paper. Staten Island represents a placebo test of the treatment effect of 
Uber on alcohol-related collisions, as it did not receive sufficient Uber coverage at this time, so its relatively-flat gap 
plot presents a robustness check. 
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Table 4.2: Synthetic Control Weights
Synthetic Control Analysis Using Alcohol-Related Collision Counts
Orange 0.258 Albany 0.432 Warren 0.332 Onondaga 0.680
Nassau 0.170 Suffolk 0.227 Onondaga 0.208 Suffolk 0.143
Onondaga 0.157 Nassau 0.194 Monroe 0.168 Monroe 0.124
Richmond 0.156 Onondaga 0.146 Albany 0.111 Richmond 0.053
Rockland 0.099 Westchester 0.103
Otsego 0.084 Erie 0.049
Wyoming 0.076 Nassau 0.029
Bronx Brooklyn Manhattan Queens
Note : using the same synthetic control analysis as appears in the body of the paper using an alcohol-related collision rate, these 
columns represent the weights of the donor counties that make up each synthetic control county using an alcohol-related collision 
monthly count. This synthetic control optimization process uses county-level alcohol-related crash counts and vehicle registrations as 
predictor series, as well as all of the individual monthly observations of alcohol-related crash counts as special predictors. 
 44 
CHAPTER 3: ESTIMATING DRUNK-DRIVING EFFECTS OF RIDE-HAILING WITH 
TRAFFIC FATALITIES DATA 
The spread of taxi-network firms that provide ride-hailing services through smartphone-
based, GPS-locator applications have forced city governments to make consequential choices 
about public transit and labor issues in recent years. Ride-hailing firms’ driver policies, treatment 
of employees, and conflicts with city government have been polarizing at best. Without a clear 
public health argument, city governments may be justified in banning ride-hailing services in 
favor of existing taxi fleets. Policymakers must evaluate the effectiveness of their transit 
systems, negotiate with entrenched taxi firms, and determine the role of private companies 
providing large-scale public transit. In some municipalities, ride-hailing services have been 
banned. In other municipalities, stakeholder groups have pre-emptively lobbied to request ride-
hailing services expand to their area.24 One of the cited benefits or goals for urban governments 
allowing ride-hailing firms into their city is a reduction in drunk-driving incidence.25  
                                                
24 Several cases are effective bans resulting from new rules whose compliance would be onerous for freelance 
drivers in personal, not commercial, vehicles. Uber shut down operations in Denmark after the government passed 
new taxi laws requiring meters and seat sensors (https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/28/uber-to-
shut-down-denmark-operation-over-new-taxi-laws last seen October 13, 2017). A similar policy requiring 
fingerprinting drivers was enacted in Austin (https://www.engadget.com/2016/05/08/uber-and-lyft-austin-shutdown/ 
last seen October 13, 2017) and withdrawn a year later. There is an outright ban in the Northern Territory of 
Australia: positive approval was required for the new service to launch in each state, and that approval was withheld 
by the legislature (https://www.gizmodo.com.au/2016/02/uber-is-now-banned-in-the-northern-territory/ last seen 
October 13, 2017). Bay County, Florida (http://www.wjhg.com/content/news/Panama-City-Beach-Bay-County-
officials-say-Uber-is-more-than-welcome-here-394891851.html last seen October 13, 2017) and several 
municipalities in Central and Western New York State (http://www.localsyr.com/news/local-news/demand-for-uber-
growing-stronger-in-central-new-york/266085498 last seen October 13, 2017) have solicited Uber access in the 
media. 
25 In December 2016, Uber partnered with Anheuser-Busch’s beer brand Budweiser in a series of advertisements to 
promote safe driving choices and discourage drunk driving (http://www.campaignlive.com/article/budweiser-
partners-uber-biggest-responsible-drinking-campaign-date/1417545 last seen October 13, 2017). In January 2015, an 
Uber press release cited a Mothers Against Drunk Driving study and claimed credit for reducing drunk driving in the 
areas it served (https://www.propublica.org/article/uber-claims-credit-for-drop-in-drunk-driving-accidents-but-
wheres-evidence last seen October 13, 2017).  
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While ride-hailing’s connection to drunk-driving reduction might seem intuitive, the 
literature on drunk driving and ride-hailing is new and sparse. There are five studies in this area, 
some still in working-paper form. Each uses a different methodological approach and only one 
finds no effect of ride-hailing on drunk-driving outcomes. Greenwood and Wattal (2015) show a 
3.6 to 5.6 percent decrease in alcohol-related traffic fatalities after the lower-priced Uber X ride-
hailing service launched in California municipalities. Dills and Mullholland (2017) show a 
statistically insignificant 7 percent decrease in total fatal crashes between treated and untreated 
U.S. counties after Uber launches, but also find that the night-time fatal crash count declines an 
additional 0.9 percent with each additional month of Uber service in their sample. While night-
time fatal crashes may be a proxy for drunk driving, their specification using alcohol-involved 
fatal crashes shows a negative, insignificant effect of much smaller magnitude. Martin-Buck 
(2016) shows a reduction in alcohol-related fatal crashes of 10 to 11.4 percent after Uber 
introduction in city centers. Peck (2017) shows a 25 to 35 percent decrease in the alcohol-related 
collision rate for New York State counties that experienced the introduction of Uber’s ride-
hailing services.  
While the other studies in this area show a few specifications with null effects, along with 
other statistically significant effects, Brazil and Kirk (2016) find no significant effects for any of 
their preferred specifications. Their study estimates the effect of Uber presence on drunk-driving 
fatalities across a sample of the 100 largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the United 
States. Contrary to the expectations of the theory laid out in their introduction, the sign of the 
statistically insignificant effect of ride-hailing service on drunk-driving fatalities is often 
positive. Brazil and Kirk (2016) present methodology and results, published for an audience of 
epidemiologists, that do not contain enough information for the analysis to be replicated by 
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another researcher. In this study, I attempt to detail the procedure Brazil and Kirk use in the 
drunk-driving portion of their results as closely as possible, and further examine whether 
alternative methodology is warranted or useful to policymakers.  
In Section 1, I compare the estimation methodologies used by the various studies that 
examine the effect of ride-hailing access on drunk driving. In Section 2, I walk through the data 
and estimation choices for replicating Brazil and Kirk’s (2016) drunk-driving effect estimates. In 
Section 3, I present summary statistics for the replication data. In Section 4, I discuss the 
estimation strategy for any study on the drunk-driving effect of ride-hailing service, focusing on 
the specific choices Brazil and Kirk make.  In Section 5, I present difference-in-differences 
results and examine the robustness of those results to differing statistical methods and 
specifications. In Section 6, I discuss the assumptions of the Poisson model in the context of 
alcohol-related fatalities data. In Section 7, I present a synthetic controls analysis. In Section 8, I 
discuss government policy implications and external validity.  
 
1. Data and Methods of Previous Studies 
Each of the studies on ride-hailing and drunk driving approaches the empirical problem 
somewhat differently, beginning with the outcome of interest. All the studies except Peck (2017) 
use a traffic-fatalities outcome measure in one of their preferred specifications. Brazil and Kirk 
(2016) use the national Fatal Accidents Reporting System (FARS) data to count traffic fatalities, 
alcohol-related traffic fatalities, and night-time and holiday traffic fatalities. Greenwood and 
Wattal (2015) also use an alcohol-related traffic fatality count, but from a California-specific 
dataset. Dills and Mullholland (2017) use FARS fatal crashes (not fatalities), alcohol-related fatal 
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crashes, and night-time fatal crashes. Martin-Buck (2017) also uses a transformed fatal-crash 
count.    
The choice of fatality versus fatal-crash as an outcome variable depends on which 
measure is more relevant to the research question. The choice to transform the variable (or not), 
however, is an issue of the desired interpretation of the final estimated effect. Martin-Buck 
(2017) uses logged FARS alcohol-related fatal crashes. Greenwood and Wattal (2015) transform 
a driver-fatality count in their California dataset by adding one and taking the natural log. I 
speculate that Greenwood and Wattal’s choice of quarterly data, rather than monthly data, may 
help suppress the zero-fatality observations in their data, making the choice to log the outcome 
variable less problematic. Logging allows for interpretation as a percentage and addresses the 
concern that the data are not well modeled by a normal distribution, but the habit of adding a 
small number to avoid logging any zero observations necessitates that the practitioner manipulate 
the regression outcome with their choice of a small additive term. This choice is particularly 
important in collision and fatalities data, because depending on frequency and cross-sectional-
unit size, these series have a high proportion of zero observations. Adjustment of the true values 
of the data would be best suited to data in which zero observations are rare and unimportant.26  
                                                
26 To illustrate why the mechanics of a log transformation of fatalities is problematic, consider the fatality count 
distribution for Australia from 1997-2015, where approximately 30 percent of the state-month traffic fatality 
observations are zero. When logged, the 70 percent non-zero portion of the distribution remains relatively intact and 
clustered together. The portion of the distribution that equals zero is mapped to negative infinity. If I could run a 
linear regression using this negative infinity value, minimizing the loss function would fit a line through those two 
clusters at negative infinity and the positive values. As I cannot estimate a linear regression line using negative 
infinity as an input value, common practice is to add a small constant to the negative infinity-values, such as 0.0001, 
or to add 1 to all observations, before logging. The choice of constant can transform the mass of zeros that would 
normally map to negative-infinity to any number between negative infinity and the minimum value of the new, 
transformed distribution. Sending the zero mass far from the rest of the distribution would give the zero mass-point 
much more leverage in determining the slope of the regression line, whereas sending the zero mass to the minimum 
of the positive-value distribution gives it less leverage.  
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The choice of fatality count, fatal-crash count, or total-crash count as an outcome variable 
highlights the difficulty of modeling an illegal behavior like drunk driving. Alcohol-related fatal 
crashes represent a very costly but relatively rare potential outcome of drunk driving.27 Alcohol-
related collisions might be a more relevant and frequent occurrence, but a dataset of alcohol-
related collisions is not available at a national scale. If traffic fatalities are detected with near 
certainty, but less-destructive alcohol-related collisions or uneventful drunk-driving instances are 
poorly detected by law enforcement, fatal crashes remain a small share of the drunk-driving 
incident distribution. Drunk-driving fatal crashes may represent a fundamentally different 
population than the average instance of all drunk-driving instances. While the purpose of an anti-
drunk-driving law may be to reduce fatalities, the worst possible outcome in a drunk-driving 
collision, predicting fatality counts or measuring fatality counts as a policy outcome is 
statistically problematic. Fatality counts, as opposed to crashes, may only measure fatal crashes 
plus a random noise parameter.28 Conditional on a drunk-driving collision occurring, it is 
unlikely that the intoxicated driver has control over the resulting fatality count between zero and 
the sum of occupants of the involved vehicles.  
Each of the studies measuring the effect of ride-hailing on drunk driving approach the 
population at risk differently. Some use an exposure variable to scale their results by the size of 
the affected population, while others model population or exposure characteristics as control 
variables in their regression analysis. For each study, these choices alter the interpretation of the 
estimated effect as well as the set of out-of-sample locations or time periods to which that effect 
might apply. Brazil and Kirk (2016) use vehicle miles travelled (VMT) multiplied by the 
                                                
27 For example, in 2010 there were 11,967 alcohol-related crashes in New York State, and 266 alcohol-related fatal 
crashes.  
28 In the introduction to Pawitan (2013), a textbook on statistical modeling and inference, the example of fatal 
crashes versus fatalities presents an intuitive introductory demonstration of statistical significance and likelihood.  
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county’s proportion of its state’s roadways as an exposure variable in their Poisson regressions, 
modeling the risk of a collision as growing with the marginal mile driven.29 In a supplemental 
table, they also present results using county population as an exposure variable, which does not 
alter the magnitude or sign of their previous findings. In the same vein, Dills and Mullholland 
(2017) scale by county population in their preferred specification. As their linear regression 
approach allows for a non-integer dependent variable, they construct a fatal crash rate by 
dividing fatal crashes by county population. This response variable lends itself to an 
interpretation about driver characteristics rather than marginal miles driven. An effect scaled 
“per driver” acknowledges that many unknown factors enter the decision function to drive drunk 
(transportation expenditure, alcoholism, weekly alcohol expenditure, gender). While the 
probability of a collision should increase with miles driven, I have seen no model of drunk 
driving that uses miles driven or length of county roadways as a determinant of drunk driving. In 
contrast, neither Martin-Buck (2016) nor Greenwood and Wattal (2015) scale their estimated 
effects based on a population at risk. Instead Martin-Buck (2016) includes population-decile 
fixed effects for each year in his monthly sample to control for characteristics that vary with a 
city’s position in the ranking of urban centers.  
Having controlled for population with fixed effects, however, forecasting the effect on a 
representative city is more difficult. A specification that treats population as a control variable 
requires back-solving and access to the estimating equation in order to apply the result of the 
study to another locale. Martin-Buck’s (2016) estimate is interpretable as an effect for a generic 
                                                
29 Michener and Tighe (1992) use VMT as one of their scale variables in a model of highway traffic fatalities. 
Likewise, DeAngelo and Hansen (2014) scale by VMT in their study on the effect of police layoffs in Oregon on 
traffic fatalities. Bhargava and Pathania (2013) and Redelmeier and Tibsharani (1997) find that cell phones increase 
driving crash risk, and measure the effect cell phone use on fatal crashes using VMT to scale the dependent variable. 
In this literature on traffic fatality risk, it is difficult to find a drunk-driving fatality study that uses VMT at all. 
Chaloupka, Saffer and Grossman (1993) include VMT as a control variable, but not as a scaling variable.  
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city-center unit, having controlled for population, while the Dills and Mullholland (2017) result 
describes a per-capita effect best applied to urban centers. This is a subtle but important 
difference in interpretation between studies examining the same research question.  
In their main results, Greenwood and Wattal (2015) neither model an exposure effect nor 
control for population, so their effect is interpretable as an average over all studied California 
municipalities. In their robustness checks they fit a model that controls for the log of population 
and the log of the population-in-poverty, yielding an average municipality interpretation that is 
less dependent on size. In a separate analysis, Greenwood and Wattal (2015) estimate differential 
treatment effects for small, medium, and large cities, to explore the hypothesis that the 
introduction of ride-hailing produced a larger effect in cities with larger populations. Peck’s 
(2017) main specification scales alcohol-related collisions by registered vehicle count in a 
county, producing a per-driver effect that emphasizes drivers rather than residents as the 
population at risk of collision. The choice of vehicles rather than population is crucial in New 
York State, as the gap between population and car ownership in New York’s urban counties is 
large and using population to represent exposure would overstate the population at risk by a 
factor of five.  
These studies on the drunk-driving effects of ride-hailing access use different units of 
cross-sectional observation, which potentially affects the size and interpretation of the result. 
Greenwood and Wattal (2015) use California municipalities. Peck (2017) uses New York State 
counties. Dills and Mullholland (2017) use all U.S. counties. Martin-Buck (2016) delimits a 5-
mile radius around the geometric centroid of all U.S. cities with population greater than 100,000. 
Brazil and Kirk (2016) use the single most populous county from each of the 100 most populous 
cities in the U.S., excepting New York, where they include all five boroughs. The choice of 
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observational units determines what comparisons of treated and control units are possible. The 
selection and aggregation of FARS crashes has implications for both internal and external 
validity. The rapid expansion of ride-hailing technology across the U.S. leaves the researcher 
with a quickly-shrinking pool of control units, which may inflate the impact of the few remaining 
cities that lack ride-hailing services. Because these studies measure approximately the same 
research question from fundamentally different samples, one study’s results may not necessarily 
be preferred over others. 
All the studies in this area take advantage of the plausibly-exogenous timing of Uber 
launches with a difference-in-differences strategy, but with different regression techniques. 
Martin-Buck (2016) uses a negative binomial regression to estimate count-model effects given 
high skewness in the data. Brazil and Kirk (2016) use a negative binomial regression for other 
sections of their analysis, but run Poisson regressions for their drunk-driving-related 
specifications when negative binomial regressions fail to converge. If the distribution of alcohol-
related fatalities is poorly modeled by a Poisson distribution, the estimate of the coefficient’s 
variance should be smaller than the true value, though it does not alter the point estimate. I 
should not expect a negative binomial regression to change the sign or magnitude, but perhaps 
the significance of Brazil and Kirk’s (2016) results. Both Peck (2017) and Dills and Mullholland 
(2017) present regression results from ordinary least squares regressions with county-clustered 
standard errors. Dills and Mullholland (2017) also present some difference-in-differences 
regressions weighted by county population to shift the model fit toward high-population urban 
counties and away from rural counties. This estimation choice implies that high-population or 
population-dense places are more important to their measurement strategy. The studies with true 
count-variable outcomes estimate Poisson and negative binomial regressions while the studies 
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measuring a rate present OLS. The exception is Greenwood and Wattal (2015), who present both 
OLS estimates and Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimates. The latter allows for robust 
standard errors and does not carry the same strict distributional assumptions as the Poisson or 
negative binomial regression that Brazil and Kirk (2016) and Martin-Buck (2016) use.  
 
2. Replication Data 
 To estimate the ride-hailing effect on drunk driving, the empiricist must choose a proxy 
for a fundamentally private action that perpetrators would prefer to hide. Measuring an illegal 
activity is difficult as violators have an incentive to avoid detection and penalties, so many 
instances of drunk driving may never be observed or recorded. In the modern era, some 
jurisdictions check blood alcohol content (BAC) at roadblocks near popular drinking areas, and 
law enforcement may issue DUI or DWI (driving under the influence, driving while intoxicated) 
citations to drivers without observing their driving at all. In other circumstances, driver behavior 
and routine policing may cause law enforcement to observe drunk driving and issue a citation. 
State laws and procedures govern both active and passive types of intoxicated driving 
observation; depending on the state, records of intoxicated driving may be kept at the precinct or 
county level only with no state or country-wide homogenization of the data. 
 In the case of a drunk-driving collision, the resulting destruction of property, injury, or 
loss of life draws attention to the event through law enforcement involvement. Depending on the 
state, the department of motor vehicles or department of transportation may collaborate to 
produce a set of state-wide collision data where law enforcement opinions as well as BAC test 
results may be linked to the collision records. This data is not always available publicly except 
through Freedom of Information Act-type requests whose administrative process, timeline, and 
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rules differ by state. These alcohol-related collision data have not been collected and harmonized 
across states.  
 On the other hand, the United State Department of Transportation maintains a public 
dataset on their website of all fatal motor vehicle crashes in the U.S., gathered from each state. 
This dataset has formed the basis of much of the drunk-driving literature to date. The Fatal 
Accident Reporting System (FARS) consists of a yearly set of interlinked records detailing 
characteristics of the collisions, vehicles, and persons related to a road fatality. While several 
drunk-driving studies take advantage of a state policy change and use that state’s internal 
records, FARS has been used for both single-state and multiple-state studies.30  
Alcohol-related fatal road collisions are a subset of alcohol-related collisions and of all 
drunk-driving events. While non-systematic measurement error in the outcome variable is not 
ideal, the infrequency of alcohol-related fatal crashes makes it difficult to discern whether there 
has been a change in the time series. At monthly frequency by county, 30 percent of the 
observations in Brazil and Kirk’s (henceforth BK) sample from 2009-2014 are zeros, indicating 
that there were no fatal drunk-driving automobile collisions in that month and county. While 
road fatalities may carry outsized importance because they comprise a large part of the youth 
fatality rate, the dataset is sparse at typical levels of aggregation. For state-level changes in 
policy, FARS may be a useful data set, but Uber launched city-by-city and the disruptive nature 
Uber’s service to established behavioral patterns may have occurred at a weekly or monthly 
                                                
30 Brazil and Kirk (2016) and Dills and Mulholand (2017) both use FARS to examine the effect of ride-hailing on 
drunk driving. Using a national sample from FARS, Kaestner and Yarnoff (2011) look at long term effects of the 
minimum legal drinking age, using traffic fatalities for 35-year-olds and Abouk and Adams (2013) examine the 
effect of the 2007 spate of state-level “texting-bans.” Kreft and Epling (2007) use FARS at a county level within 
Michigan to measure the effect of relative proximity to a differential-drinking-age border (Ontario, Canada) on 
drunk-driving fatalities. DeAngelo and Hansen (2014) use FARS in a difference-in-differences and synthetic 
controls analysis of police enforcement on traffic fatalities, with Idaho and Washington employed as counterfactuals 
for Oregon, which experienced a shock to police employment levels. 
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pace: aggregating to yearly data in the time dimension or state data in the cross-sectional 
dimension would destroy information that researchers could leverage for analysis.   
 
3. Replication Summary Statistics 
To replicate BK’s work, I first attempt to match their table of summary statistics. I 
restrict the time frame of the data to 2005-2014 for total road fatalities, and 2009-2014 for 
alcohol-related road fatalities. In Table 1, these figures are split by county-months where Uber is 
present or not, for the 104 counties in the BK sample.  
Since estimating the ride-hailing effect on drunk-driving outcomes in this sample rests on 
a difference-in-differences methodology staggered over both time and place, the metaphor of a 
medical randomized-control trial with separate treatment and control groups is less clear. In 
Table 2, I present means comparing the pre-2010 series, stratified by whether a county ever 
receives ride-hailing access. At this point in any difference-in-differences analysis, it is standard 
to demonstrate balance between ever-treated and control groups, to defend the common trends 
assumption. BK’s summary statistics table stratifies only by Uber presence in a county-month, 
which does not alleviate these concerns. In Table 2, the pre-treatment period shows similar 
average alcohol-related fatality rates between treatment and control groups, but quite different 
average fatality counts and populations. To visually illustrate the pre-treatment trends based on 
time to ride-hailing launch, I regress alcohol-related fatality counts and alcohol-related fatality 
rate on a set of dummy variables representing the time remaining until ride-hailing service 
launches. I omit all counties that never receive ride-hailing service. Any observable pre-period 
trend in the graph might suggest that launch locations were selected based on drunk-driving 
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behavior and the urgency of service a high-risk population rather than any other criterion, but no 
such trend is visible in Figure 1 (fatality counts) or Figure 2 (fatality rate). 
Because Uber launches by city and this research question is germane to urban 
environments, BK restrict their sample of road fatalities to those in most populous county in each 
of the top 100 most populous MSAs. As an exception, BK separately include all five New York 
City boroughs. To construct an “access” indicator variable for Uber presence, they use both 
Uber’s own press releases and the popular press to determine Uber presence and launch date. A 
list of the BK MSAs, counties, and launch dates are reproduced in Appendix 1, with the control 
counties listed in Table 1.1 and treated counties in Table 1.2.   
 In Table 2, I present both BK’s summary statistics and my own replication of their 
statistics. After omitting records with missing values for state, county, and drunk-driving status 
and restricting the sample to the same city list and timeframe, my dataset still contains several 
hundred more road fatalities than the BK sample. This is true for both the “with Uber” and 
“without Uber” categories in Table 2. There is also a very small subset of observations with 
latitude and longitude coordinates that are in accord with the collision’s associated state variable, 
but are missing the county variable. These records could be included but I have omitted them, as 
my sample is already larger than the sample in BK (2016). Despite these attempts to match BK 
(2016), the results do not match exactly, though they are close.   
In their table of summary statistics, BK present average values per county-month and the 
number of observations for their longer sample time period that reflects total fatalities rather than 
drunk-driving fatalities. I present these reproduced figures in Table 2. While BK assert that 
FARS drunk-driving information was available beginning only in 2009 and clip their sample 
period accordingly, FARS drunk-driving information is in fact available on a national level at 
 56 
least from 2000. In the results section I present regression estimates for both the BK 2009 start 
date as well as a 2000 start date. 
Each FARS table of yearly data contains two drunk-driving variables and “accident-
level” drunk-driver variable and a “vehicle-level” drunk-driver variable. The “accident-level” 
drunk-driver variable was improperly calculated in some years, in part because it was a derived 
variable indicating intoxicated persons rather than intoxicated drivers. In the replicated BK 
sample, the difference in fatality count between these two variables is small. I construct a drunk-
driving indicator based only on the vehicle-records’ drunk-driver variable to avoid this problem. 
The fatalities figure in Table 2, based on the vehicle records rather than the accident records, 
most closely matches BK’s drunk-driving fatalities figure.  
In addition to traffic fatalities and Uber launch dates, this study uses county-level 
population as an exposure variable in Poisson regressions and as a denominator in constructing 
fatality rates. The U.S. Census Bureau provides county-level population figures by year, which 
may be interpolated to monthly figures.  
 
4. Estimation 
 To estimate Uber’s effect on traffic fatalities, BK use a difference-in-differences 
identification strategy and a Poisson regression because of the count data structure of the 
fatalities variable. I infer that Equation 1 below describes BK’s Poisson regression of road 
fatalities on Uber presence using MSA population as an “exposure” variable.   𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐸 𝐹𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑆#$	 	𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠)= 	𝛼 + 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑌$)	𝛽 + 𝑀𝑂𝑁𝑇𝐻#	) 𝛾 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅#)	𝜁 + 𝜂 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑂𝑃#$+ 	𝜃	𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷#$ + 𝜀#$ (1) 
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FATALITIES is a count of traffic fatalities, including those who died a short time after the 
accident as a result of their injuries. MONTH is a dummy variable for each of the calendar 
months. YEAR is a of dummy variable for each year, log(POP) is the log of the MSA population 
or county population in which the fatality occurred, as an exposure variable in the Poisson 
regression. TREATED is a dummy variable equal to one in months and locations where Uber is 
present.  
 Of the 104 counties represented in BK’s sample, five are boroughs of New York City, 84 
counties gained Uber access between 2009 and 2014, and 20 counties are pure “control” units 
that never receive Uber access. Checking the Uber launch dates for counties Brazil and Kirk 
mark as control units revealed that all of these locations received Uber access by the end of 2016. 
Four control counties received Uber access by late 2014, affecting the construction of the 
treatment variable in the BK sample: Boise in October 2014, San Jose at least by June 2014, Des 
Moines in September 2014, and Portland in December 2014. Even without this adjustment, the 
control counties comprise less than 20 percent of the sample.  
 Figure 3 shows a histogram of 2010 MSA populations in BK’s sample split between 
treatment and control counties. There are 20 control counties for comparison with the 80 treated 
counties, and most control units have a smaller than average population. Portland, the largest city 
in the control group, had a 2010 population of about one tenth of New York City’s population. In 
the potential outcomes framework on which BK’s identification strategy relies, the control units 
should be plausible substitutes for observing the treated units in an untreated state. Lacking a 
perfect experiment, the empiricist compares treatment and control units that are as similar as 
possible. I address the choice of comparison group in the results section. The remaining 
histograms in Figure 3 use aggregated yearly data from 2005, before the advent of Uber, and 
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represent histograms for alcohol-related fatality counts and fatality rates by county in the 
treatment and control groups. The FARS data provides information on both fatalities from drunk-
driving accidents and deaths assigned to a vehicle (omitting fatally-struck pedestrians and 
cyclists), that produce nearly identical results. Like the population histogram, the control group 
histograms of fatality-count and fatality-rate show significantly smaller than the average control 
group values compared to treatment group values. Before turning to regression results, I note that 
the differences between the treatment and control groups along several variables suggests that 
other behaviors, like those that determine drunk-driving rates, may differ similarly. 
 
5. Difference-in-Differences Results 
In this study, I replicate some of BK’s estimation results, focusing on the effect of Uber 
access on alcohol-related traffic fatalities. In Web Table 3 of their paper, BK measure the effect 
of Uber access on drunk-driving outcomes using Poisson regressions in a difference-in-
differences framework with county population as the exposure variable. I focus on this 
specification rather than other specifications with different exposure and outcome variables that 
are less germane to the central research question. 
Table 3 presents BK’s estimates and my attempted replication. The incidence rate ratios 
in Table 3 represent a ratio of the alcohol-related traffic-fatality incidence rate for with-Uber 
populations to the same metric for without-Uber populations. Positive rather than negative 
incident rate ratios in this context imply that Uber access for a county is associated with a higher 
alcohol-related fatality count, controlling for the county level population. An increased (rather 
than decreased) fatality count is the opposite of the expected outcome and the effects are not 
statistically different from zero, because the 95 percent confidence intervals include 1.  
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Since the FARS data include two possible measures of drunk-driving fatalities, I present 
specifications for both accident-level fatalities and deaths assigned to particular vehicles in the 
incident, which yield similar results. I use county population either as an independent control 
regressor or as the exposure variable that allows a Poisson regression, despite its requirement for 
an integer (count) dependent variable, to approximate a rate as deaths per 100,000 county 
residents.  
As a first departure from BK’s methodology, I present a simple OLS difference-in-
differences regression (rather than Poisson regression) on the same sample of drunk-driving 
fatalities in top MSA counties between 2009 and 2014. Table 4 includes these results with both 
accident-level fatality and vehicle-death measures, and with both MSA population and county 
population as a control or exposure variable. As with BK’s main results, the effects are small, 
switch signs, and only one is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The estimated effect 
of Uber access on the accident-level alcohol-related fatality rate is 0.01, showing an implied 
increase of 0.01 alcohol-related fatalities per 100,000 county residents at a 5 percent significance 
level.  
 Retaining the original sample counties and years, I split the sample in half by MSA 
population, producing a top and bottom 50 percent sample that might produce more comparable 
treatment and control groups if the size of the city is a key determinant of drunk-driving 
behavior. While my intention is to underscore that control group counties come from smaller 
MSAs and the bottom 50 percent sample may present a clearer comparison, I provide both the 
top and bottom 50 percent sample results for completeness. None of the effects measured in 
Table 5 are statistically significant and the magnitude of the effects is quite small. In the bottom 
50 percent sample results, the sign of the effects in the count models is consistently negative and 
 60 
the sign of the rate models is consistently positive. For the top 50 percent specification, the 
results are more consistently negative, but there are many fewer control units available.  
Having explored the robustness of BK’s preferred cross-sectional units, I expand the 
timeline from 2009-2014 to 2000-2015. I update the treatment variable from the BK definition 
accordingly and adjust the sample MSA list to omit outliers. Because time passed since BK’s 
data collection, many more MSAs have experienced ride-hailing-service launches. Additionally, 
articles in the press have detailed service launches during BK’s sample timeframe in MSAs that 
BK placed in the untreated group. I list the MSAs I have moved from the untreated group to the 
treated group in Appendix 1. To address outliers and poor comparisons between MSAs, I restrict 
the sample by removing the top 20 percent of counties by MSAs population. The effects 
presented in Table 6 using this methodology are not statistically significant and are more 
consistently positively signed than the bottom 50 percent sample from Table 5. The results in 
Table 6 suggest that it is not the fatality measure (accident-level fatalities versus vehicle-level 
deaths), or the choice of population measure used in the rate denominator that is driving the 
results.  
BK’s results are also robust to estimation using a sample that prioritizes population 
density rather than population level, with county units and monthly frequency. As a blend of 
Martin-Buck’s “city-center” sample and BK’s populous-county sample, I present a third sample 
of counties selected on population density rather than population size. From the Census bureau’s 
list of the top 200 counties by population density, I omit any geographical units with a 
population less than 10,000 persons, leaving 192 units out of the original 200.31   
                                                
31 These tiny, population-dense units often constitute small towns surrounded by wilderness whose density is a 
function of how tightly the border of the town is drawn. 
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I use the same newsroom-site data on Uber launches as BK, joined to the Census 
Bureau’s city-county crosswalk. I include only counties with a geographical overlap of a city (as 
opposed to an MSA). Some recent launch announcements describe vaguer geographical areas 
than cities. Examples include “Greater Maine,” “The Hamptons,” or “Piedmont Triad.” To 
capture treatment salience, I use popular definitions of geographic regions from Wikipedia.com 
and Google Maps, adjusted based on my priors.32 This methodology produces estimated 
difference-in-differences effects similar to those that BK produce: the effects are mostly positive, 
have small magnitudes, and have standard errors similar in size to the effect itself, suggesting 
that the effect is not statistically different from zero.  
 
6. Examination of the Poisson Regression’s Assumptions 
BK consistently present Poisson regressions when using count data, although the Poisson 
distribution is often a poor fit for count data.33 While a test for over-dispersion rejects the null 
hypothesis that the data fits a Poisson model, Monte Carlo simulations have shown that this test 
                                                
32 For the Hamptons, I include Suffolk County but not Nassau County. For New Jersey, I include Hudson, Essex, 
Union, Bergen, Camden, Gloucester, Passaic, Middlesex, Mercer, Morris and Somerset counties. Given the “New 
Jersey Shore” launch the following year, I omit Monmouth and Ocean counties from the “New Jersey” launch date 
in 2013, in favor of the May 2014 Jersey Shore launch. Despite the proximity to the Jersey Shore, I include 
Middlesex county in the greater New Jersey launch rather than the Jersey Shore launch. I include Fairfield, New 
Haven, and Hartford counties in the Connecticut launch in April 2014. Baltimore city had already reported a 
February 2013 launch, so that the “Greater Maryland” launch would potentially apply to Baltimore, Montgomery, 
Prince George, Anne Arundel, and Howard counties in my data. From the Piedmont Triad in North Carolina, I 
include Guilford and Forsyth counties in my data. For Hampton Roads, I include the nearby independent cities of 
Virginia Beach, Norfolk, and Newport News. In Western Massachusetts, I include Hampton County. None of the 
Central Atlantic Coast (Florida) or Florida Keys counties besides Miami-Dade are dense enough for inclusion in the 
data set, and Miami-Dade reported a June 2014 launch ahead of the December 2014 announcement for both the 
Florida Keys and the Central Atlantic Coast. No counties in the Inland Empire of California, Northwest Indiana, 
New Hampshire, or Greater Maine were dense enough for inclusion in my data.  
33 For further information, see the Cameron and Trivedi (2005) discussion of Poisson maximum likelihood 
estimation in Chapter 20. If the mean and variance are not equal, but the conditional mean is correctly specified, the 
estimates are consistent. If the data suffers from truncation or censoring, however, overdispersion in a Poisson 
regression could imply inconsistency and small standard errors leading to inference problems.  
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over-rejects when the mean of the data is low.34 The mean in this dataset of alcohol-related 
automobile fatalities is approximately 2, which is quite low, but the p-value on the chi-squared 
test is 6.28 x 10-59. Despite a worry of over-rejection of the test, a p-value that low suggests the 
Poisson model is a poor choice here. The results of the over-dispersion test comparing the fit of a 
Poisson and Negative Binomial regression suggest that a negative binomial regression may be a 
more appropriate specification.  
There are theoretical reasons researchers might consider alternative modeling approaches 
to the Poisson: if some or all the zeros observed in the model are drawn from a different data 
generating process. If some of the zeros are drawn from a different data-generating process, 
producing an overabundance of zeros in the data, a zero-inflated model (zero-inflated negative 
binomial or zero-inflated Poisson regression) might be appropriate; if instead all of the zeros are 
drawn from a different data-generating process than the nonzero observations, such that the 
count model applies only to the strictly nonzero counts, a hurdle model would be a better choice. 
BK’s aggregation of the FARS data series represents observations for counties, by month. Since 
fatal crashes are difficult to hide or suppress in the long run, it is unlikely this is a classic case of 
censored data. While counties with different laws, policies, or levels of policing might produce 
zeros in a time-invariant way that is absorbed by the county fixed effect, it is difficult to see how 
county-level phenomena could produce zero-fatality observational units without also reducing 
fatalities overall. 
The underlying mechanism, however, is an aggregation of individual actions of people in 
the county. Whether an individual contributes to a drunk-driving fatal collision could be modeled 
                                                
34 Pawitan (2013) notes that a deviance goodness of fit test is acceptable for Poisson if the mean of the data is not 
too small. The blog “The Stats Geek” shows an intuitive example of this phenomenon with simulated data here: 
http://thestatsgeek.com/2014/04/26/deviance-goodness-of-fit-test-for-poisson-regression/ last seen October 13, 
2017.  
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with two models that both produce zeros: one models whether the individual leaves the house at 
all, and the other models whether, given drinking and subsequent driving, she makes it to her 
destination without a collision. The non-drunk-driving zero might comprise staying home and 
not drinking, drinking from home and not driving, or going out while appropriately arranging for 
a cab driver or a friend to drive. The potentially-observed-drunk-driving zero is conditional on 
drinking away from home and is a function of how much alcohol is consumed, the distance to the 
destination, probability of law enforcement apprehending the driver before damage is done, and 
other road factors. In aggregate, the people in a county may contribute their actions to these two 
mechanisms, producing the final drunk-driving fatality count.  
Since the underlying individual actions might be theoretically well modeled with a hurdle 
or zero-inflated model, I fit a logit-negative-binomial hurdle model and a zero-inflated negative 
binomial model, as well as a simple negative binomial model for comparison. I present IRRs 
rather than raw coefficients for the count models so that the BK results are comparable. I present 
coefficients rather than IRRs for the zero models in the hurdle and zero-inflated specifications, 
since the function of these coefficients is to describe an additive effect, rather than the 
multiplicative effect the count-model treatment coefficient describes. The negative binomial, 
zero-inflated, and hurdle models in Table 7 show count-model treatment effects that are of a 
similar magnitude and significance to most of the BK results. While neither is statistically 
significant, the count-model treatment effects for the original 2009-2014 sample show positive 
effects while those from the longer 2000-2015 sample timeframe show negative effects. This 
change in sign might imply that the longer timeframe better captures the trend of the longer pre-
period, resulting in a more realistic causal estimate. As BK suggest, it may overemphasize, 
instead, the one-time effect of increased car manufacturing safety regulations and seatbelt laws in 
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the early 2000s, which they cite as a reason for omitting data from this timeframe in their drunk-
driving specifications.  
 
7. Synthetic Control Analysis 
Rather than a subjective choice of comparison units for treated MSA counties, a synthetic 
control analysis allows for control-unit selection based on pre-period trends.35 Figure 4 shows 
synthetic control gap-plots representing a time series of the difference between an observed 
county and its synthetically-produced control county composed of a weighted average of control 
counties from the BK sample. The synthetic-control county composition is determined by 
minimizing the distance between the pre-period alcohol-related traffic fatalities series of a treated 
county and that of an amalgam of control counties with weights summing to one. Figure 4 
contains one plot from each decile in the BK MSA sample in descending order of MSA 
population. The low variance from the zero line in the pre-period of each plot suggests that the fit 
of each series is relatively good for all plots except Little Rock. The section of the gap-plot to the 
right of the black vertical line does not visually diverge from the pre-period trajectory of the 
series, suggesting that for each of these well-fitted series, synthetic control analysis shows no 
measurable effect of Uber access on alcohol-related traffic fatalities. Once all “ever-Uber” 
counties are removed from the potential donor pool in this sample, only 16 are left as comparison 
units. In Table 8, I list each treated county’s matched group of control counties and their weights. 
It is difficult to judge whether the comparison counties generated from a numerical minimization 
algorithm are theoretically appropriate, since often the largest weights are assigned to counties 
                                                
35 I construct the synthetic control comparison units using the approach in Abadie, Diamond 
and Hainmueller (2010). I use the R package “Synth” whose documentation found at https://cran.r-
project.org/web/packages/Synth/Synth.pdf last seen October 13, 2017. 
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from different geographic regions of the country with differing levels of urban density. Figure 4, 
in the context of the preceding section’s difference-in-differences results, suggests that Uber 
access had no measurable effect on the alcohol-related traffic fatalities in BK’s sample and also 
no discernable heterogeneous effect at different points in the distribution of MSA size. 
 
8. Discussion and Conclusion 
The methodology that BK employ is troubling on several points. The choice to use many 
states instead of a single state puts the empiricist in the position of become a historical expert on 
all municipal and state policy changes that might affect drunk driving across the country. For 
instance, Staten Island was not treated by the arrival of Uber in New York City; as noted in Peck 
(2017), a dataset of 2014 Uber pickups showed only 30 pickups per month in Staten Island. 
Without access to proprietary data or intense study of each MSA’s reporting, there is a strong 
possibility that an empiricist might bias their estimation with an incorrectly-coded treatment 
variable.  
The choice to use the most populous county in an MSA instead of all counties in an MSA 
reduces the potential sample size and ignores the stated level of the policy change – often at the 
city or MSA level. BK’s main results show an IRR of 1.03 with a 95 percent confidence interval 
from 0.97 to 1.10. Based on their estimating equation and sample, they would need at least an 
IRR of 0.935 for statistical significance (from the 95 percent confidence interval between 0.87 
and 1 necessary for a significant effect). This minimum observable IRR corresponds to a 6.5 
percent decrease in alcohol-related traffic fatalities. Greenwood and Wattal’s (2015) 3.6 to 5.6 
percent estimate range is smaller than this minimum effect. A similarly sized effect in the BK 
sample would fall within the 95 percent confidence interval and would not be deemed 
 66 
statistically significant. Martin-Buck’s (2016) “city center only” approach estimates a 10 percent 
decrease and is methodologically closer to BK’s sample of “populous urban counties.” Dills and 
Mullholland (2017) sample of all U.S. counties has many more rural, untreated units than BK. 
Their alcohol-related traffic fatality effect is not significant, but their night-time traffic-fatality 
dynamic effect of about 1 percent decreased fatality rate per additional month of ride-hailing 
service is significant in their own study but would fall within the BK 95 percent confidence 
interval. The largest of the effects in the literature is found in Peck (2017). If scaled to reflect 
BK’s empirical approach rather than a New York State sample, the effect would fall outside of 
BK’s 95 percent confidence interval.36 BK’s methodology would cause them to fail to observe 
the effects found in half of the studies in this research area. 
Other estimated effects in the drunk-driving literature are too small to have been 
measured with statistical significance in BK’s study as well. Dee and Evans (2001b) find that 
teen traffic fatalities fell by at least 5 percent after states raised the minimum legal drinking age 
to 21. This lower bound is within the BK 95 percent confidence interval, though some of Dee 
and Evans’ specifications produce estimates of 8 to 10 percent which would be detectable in 
BK’s regression sample. Dee (2001) estimates that the effect of 0.08 BAC laws reduced total 
traffic fatality rates by 7.2 percent after controlling for administrative license revocation policies 
and other control variables using the FARS database. This effect fits within the BK 95 percent 
confidence interval, but is estimated for total traffic fatalities rather than alcohol-related traffic 
fatalities.   
                                                
36 The reduction in alcohol-related crashes per 100,000 registered vehicles in a New York State sample under 
specification 2 in Peck (2017), using geographically-nearby counties as control units, is 3.32. I scale this figure by 
registered vehicles per person in New York State and alcohol-related fatalities per alcohol-related crash in New 
York State, and calculate alcohol-related fatalities per 100,000 persons from the replication sample of BK above. 
The ratio of the implied reduction in alcohol-related fatalities per 100,000 persons from Peck (2017) and the mean 
alcohol-related fatalities per 100,000 persons implied in the BK replication represents a percentage change of -18.91 
percent, outside the -0.03 percent to 10 percent bounds of the 95 percent confidence interval in BK Web Table 3.  
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 If the true effect in BK’s sample were small, like Greenwood and Wattal’s 3.6 to 5.6 
percent effect or Dee’s (2001) 5 percent effect, the estimation methodology may have been too 
underpowered to observe it at a statistically significant level. The other studies from Dills and 
Mullholland (2017), Martin-Buck (2016), and Peck (2017) estimate effects large enough that 
BK’s sample was sufficiently powered to estimate it at a statistically significant level if it exists. 
Separately, using rarely-observed proxies for illegal behavior like drunk driving may be 
problematic: FARS is a clean but sparse data source. It would be better to have an alcohol-
related collisions measure, but until state data is collected and harmonized this is unlikely to be 
an accessible resource for researchers.  
Lastly, the common trends assumption of the difference-in-differences framework 
assumes that the treated counties and the never-treated counties, at least in aggregate, are good 
counterfactual comparisons for one another. If there are many fewer control counties than treated 
counties and the control counties exhibit fundamentally different trends from the treatment group 
counties, the potential outcomes framework for measuring a causal effect may not be warranted 
and a descriptive study might be more appropriate. This narrow choice of counties stands in 
contrast to Dills and Mullholland’s (2017) study that uses all 242 U.S. counties.  
I explored the robustness of BK’s findings to methodology, model specification, and 
adjustment of the treatment variable. As the first published study on ride-hailing and drunk 
driving and the only one to show no effect, BK’s study stood out as a target for examination and 
comparison. While there are significant criticisms to be made of BK’s original methodology, 
their results, holding the observational units constant, are robust to the changes in specification I 
have employed.  
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This study holds some useful conclusions for health economists and data practitioners. 
Because alcohol-related traffic fatalities in FARS is a sparse variable, with non-zero observations 
that are relatively rare, it is not necessarily an appropriate variable for analysis of this research 
question, though FARS has been invaluable in other areas of transit and health research. 
Members of city and state government seeking to interpret this result should do so narrowly: 
there is no direct, measurable effect, on average, for a selection of counties in the top 100 MSAs 
on drunk-driving fatalities, but that does not rule out potential effects of other drunk-driving 
outcomes and other sample locations.   
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 County Units 84 20
Average Yearly Fatality Count Over Period 32.68 15.30
Average Yearly Fatality Rate Over Period 3.43 2.66
Mean Pre-Period Monthly Alcohol-Related Fatality Count 2.25 0.80
Mean Pre-Period Monthly Alcohol-Related Fatality Rate 0.29 0.22
Mean Pre-Period Monthly Alcohol-Related County Population 1,116,607.03 578,936.44
Fatality Count Over Period 33.04 14.85
Fatality Rate Over Period 3.50 2.39
Mean Pre-Period Monthly Alcohol-Related Fatality Count 2.31 0.75
Mean Pre-Period Monthly Alcohol-Related Fatality Rate 0.29 0.20
Mean Pre-Period Monthly Alcohol-Related County Population 1,097,420.78 570,124.05
Fatality Count Over Period 34.01 15.65
Fatality Rate Over Period 3.66 2.65
Mean Pre-Period Monthly Alcohol-Related Fatality Count 2.37 0.75
Mean Pre-Period Monthly Alcohol-Related Fatality Rate 0.31 0.22
Mean Pre-Period Monthly Alcohol-Related County Population 1,107,044.24 568,441.75
Fatality Count Over Period 34.77 16.35
Fatality Rate Over Period 3.81 2.90
Mean Pre-Period Monthly Alcohol-Related Fatality Count 2.40 0.85
Mean Pre-Period Monthly Alcohol-Related Fatality Rate 0.32 0.24
Mean Pre-Period Monthly Alcohol-Related County Population 1,115,955.15 576,384.17
Fatality Count Over Period 31.92 15.45
Fatality Rate Over Period 3.24 2.69
Mean Pre-Period Monthly Alcohol-Related Fatality Count 2.23 0.80
Mean Pre-Period Monthly Alcohol-Related Fatality Rate 0.27 0.22
Mean Pre-Period Monthly Alcohol-Related County Population 1,125,829.08 585,900.80
Fatality Count Over Period 29.68 14.20
Fatality Rate Over Period 2.96 2.67
Mean Pre-Period Monthly Alcohol-Related Fatality Count 2.02 0.75
Mean Pre-Period Monthly Alcohol-Related Fatality Rate 0.25 0.22
Mean Pre-Period Monthly Alcohol-Related County Population 1,136,785.90 593,831.44
Note:  Based on Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) aggregated monthly  alcohol-related traffic fatality counts and Census 
Bureau county population data associated with the 99 counties that have the largest population within their MSA, plus all New York 
City boroughs. These data are stratefied into treated and control groups based on whether the county's MSA experienced an Uber 
launch before end 2014. 
2005-2009
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Table 2: Brazil and Kirk Sample Pre-Period Summary Statistics Stratified by 
Future Ride-Hailing Presence
Treated Control
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Table 4: Difference-in-Differences Estimates 
OLS Regression of Fatality Measures on Ride-Hailing Access
2009-2014 Sample
Treatment Coefficient 0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 * 0.01 0.01 * 0.01
    WBSEs - Clustered (0.08 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 ) (0.01 )
    Cluster-Robust SEs [ 0.09 ] [ 0.08 ] [ 0.08 ] [ 0.08 ] [ 0.01 ] [ 0.01 ] [ 0.01 ] [ 0.01 ]
Using MSA Population Y  Y  Y  Y  
Using County Population Y  Y  Y  Y  
Dep. Var. Mean 2.08 2.08 1.91 1.19 0.14 0.22 0.13 0.21
Pct Change 1.27 % 0.90 % -0.84 % -0.52 % 7.28 % 5.53 % 7.41 % 4.97 %
Adj. R-Sq. 0.65 0.65 0.61 0.61 0.29 0.11 0.28 0.10
Note:  OLS coefficient estimates from the regression of various alcohol-related traffic fatality measures on ride-hailing access. Wild bootstrap standard 
errors clustered at the county level are presented in parentheses and standard clustered standard errors in square brackets. These estimates use the Brazil 
and Kirk sample timeframe 2009-2014 and sample counties from the 100 largest MSAs. There are 7,488 county-month observations. Significance 
levels are indicated by * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01. Data source is the Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) data set accident-level tables for the 
accident-fatalities count and rate specifications, and vehicle-level tables for the vehicle-death count and rate specifications. For each unique dependent 
variable, I present coefficient estimates from a specification that controls for population either as a regressor or as the denominator of the dependent rate 
variable.
Accident Fatalities Vehicle Deaths Accident-Fatality Rate Vehicle-Death Rate
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Table 5: Difference-in-Differences Estimates 
OLS Regression of Fatality Measures on Ride-Hailing Access
Split By MSA Population Size, 2009-2014 Sample
Coef. -0.051 -0.047 -0.029 -0.026 < | 0.001 | 0.003 0.003 0.005
    WBSEs - Clustered ( 0.113 ) ( 0.098 ) ( 0.099 ) ( 0.104 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.014 ) ( 0.021 )
    Standard Clustered [ 0.111 ] [ 0.114 ] [ 0.110 ] [ 0.114 ] [ 0.016 ] [ 0.023 ] [ 0.015 ] [ 0.022 ]
Using MSA Pop Y  Y   Y  Y  
Using County Pop Y  Y  Y  Y  
Dep. Var. Mean 1.38 1.38 1.30 1.30 0.19 0.26 0.18 0.25
Pct Change -3.68 % -3.40 % -2.22 % -1.98 % -0.10 % -0.10 % 1.64 % 2.09 %
Adj. R-Sq. 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.12 0.18 0.12
N 3600 3600 3600 3600 3600 3600 3600 3600
Coef. -0.017 -0.017 -0.066 -0.058 < | 0.001 | -0.001 < | 0.001 | -0.002
    WBSEs - Clustered ( 0.111 ) ( 0.114 ) ( 0.115 ) ( 0.112 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.010 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.008 )
    Standard Clustered [ 0.128 ] [ 0.124 ] [ 0.117 ] [  0.113 ] [ 0.005 ] [ 0.010 ] [ 0.004 ] [ 0.009 ]
Using MSA Pop Y  Y   Y  Y  
Using County Pop Y  Y  Y  Y  
Dep. Var. Mean 2.89 2.89 2.63 2.63 0.10 0.20 0.09 0.18
Pct Change -0.58 % -0.60 % -2.50 % -2.20 % 0.48 % -0.51 % 0.09 % -1.34 %
Adj. R-Sq. 0.69 0.69 0.66 0.66 0.36 0.05 0.34 0.04
N 3600 3600 3600 3600 3600 3600 3600 3600
Accident Fatalities Vehicle Deaths Accident-Fatality Rate Vehicle-Death Rate
Note : OLS coefficient estimates from the regression of various alcohol-related traffic fatality measures on ride-hailing access. These estimates use the Brazil and Kirk 
sample timeframe 2009-2014 and sample counties from the 100 largest MSAs. The original sample is broken into two samples by MSA population to produce treatment 
and control comparisons from similar cities.  Wild bootstrap standard errors clustered at the county level are presented in parentheses and standard county-clustered 
errors in square brackets. These estimates use the Brazil and Kirk timeframe 2009-2014 and counties from the 100 largest MSAs. The bottom 50 dataset includes 37 
treated counties and 14 control counties. the top 50 dataset includes 48 treated counties and 6 control counties. Significance levels are indicated by * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, 
*** < 0.01. 
Bottom 50 MSAs
Top 50 MSAs
Accident Fatalities Vehicle Deaths Accident-Fatality Rate Vehicle-Death Rate
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Table 6: Difference-in-Differences Estimates 
OLS Regression of Fatality Measures on Ride-Hailing Access
2000-2014, Bottom 80% Sample by MSA Population With Updated Launch Dates and County-Specific Trends
Coef. 0.014 -0.003 0.036 0.019 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.262
    WBSE - Clustered ( 0.083 ) ( 0.094 ) ( 0.083 ) ( 0.077 ) ( 0.009 ) ( 0.015 ) ( 0.007 ) ( 0.014 )
    Standard Clustered [ 0.088 ] [ 0.092 ] [ 0.080 ] [ 0.114 ] [ 0.009 ] [ 0.015 ] [ 0.008 ] [ 0.013 ]
Using MSA Pop Y  Y  Y  Y  
Using County Pop Y  Y  Y  Y  
County Time Trend Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Dep. Var. Mean 1.73 1.73 1.62 1.62 0.19 0.28 0.17 0.26
Pct. Change 0.79 % -0.19 % 2.22 % 1.19 % 2.10 % 1.80 % 3.58 % 100.00 %
Adj. R-Sq. 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.07 0.27 0.07
N 14,240 14,240 14,240 14,240 14,240 14,240 14,240 14,240
Vehicle-Deaths RateAccident-Fatality RateVehicle DeathsAccident Fatalities
Note : Wild bootstrap standard errors clustered at the county level are presented in parentheses and standard county-clustered 
errors in square brackets. Significance levels are indicated by * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01. These estimates use a July 2000 - 
July 2015 sample timeframe, with the Brazil and Kirk sample counties from the 100 largest MSAs. By mid 2015 most of the 
MSAs in the sample experienced an Uber launch leaving only the following counties as control locations: Birmingham, Las 
Vegas, Ogden, Provo-Orem, Albany-Schenectady-Troy, Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, and Youngstown-Warren-Boardman.
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Table 7: Difference-in-Differences Estimates 
Negative Binomial and Mixture Model Regressions of
Alcohol-Related Fatality Counts on Ride-Hailing Access
Brazil and Kirk MSA Sample with Updated Launch Dates
Negative Binomial Regression
    IRR on Treatment 1.047 0.983
    95% Conf. Interval ( 0.977, 1.122 ) ( 0.924, 1.046 )
Hurdle Regression (Negative Binomial, Logit)
    IRR on Treatment (Count Model) 1.055 0.977
    95% Conf. Interval (0.977, 1.140) ( 0.910, 1.048 )
    Treatment Coefficient (Zero Model) -0.055 -0.023
    95% Conf. Interval ( -0.283, 0.173 ) ( -0.211, 0.166 )
Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression
    IRR on Treatment (Count Model) 1.047 0.983
    95% Conf. Interval ( 0.977, 1.122 ) ( 0.924, 1.046 )
    Treatment Coefficient (Zero Model) -18.268 -18.034
    95% Conf. Interval ( -1805.885, 1769.349 ) ( -957.222, 921.155 )
N 7,488 18,512
2009-2014 Sample 2000-2015 Sample
Note : incidence rate ratios from negative binomial, zero-inflated negative binomial, and hurdle regressions. 95% 
confidence intervals using standard errors clustered at the county level are shown in parentheses. All models use "month of 
the year" and yearly dummy variables. In the columns above, results from two sample timeframes are presented from data 
at monthly frequency from January 2009 through December 2014 in the first column and July 2000 through April 2015 in 
the second column. Both samples include all Brazil and Kirk counties from the 100 largest U.S. MSAs. The significance 
level of these results are robust to changes in the sample cross-sectional composition (e.g. using the bottom 80% of MSAs 
by population), use of a longer or shorter timeframe, and the use of Poisson regression rather than a negative binomial 
regression to estimate the hurdle and zero-inflated models. 
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Table 8: Donor County Weights for Synthetic Control Counties
Donor County Donor County MSA Weight Donor County Donor County MSA Weight
Albany Albany-Schenectady-Troy 0.005 Hampden Springfield 0.175
Erie Buffalo 0.230 Clark Las Vegas 0.036
Utah Provo-Orem 0.765 Erie Buffalo 0.061
Onondaga Syracuse 0.076
Lackawanna Scranton-Wilkes-Barre 0.077
Jefferson Birmingham 0.016 Lehigh Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton 0.278
Richmond Augusta-Richmond 0.066 Utah Provo-Orem 0.296
Orleans New Orleans 0.116
Hampden Springfield 0.140
Erie Buffalo 0.211 Jefferson Birmingham 0.262
Monroe Rochester 0.150 Orleans New Orleans 0.238
Lackawanna Scranton-Wilkes-Barre 0.054 Clark Las Vegas 0.165
Lehigh Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton 0.014 Monroe Rochester 0.176
Utah Provo-Orem 0.079 Mahoning Youngstown-Warren-Boardman 0.084
Weber Ogden 0.155 Weber Ogden 0.075
Jefferson Birmingham 0.011 Jefferson Birmingham 0.110
Orleans New Orleans 0.145 Hampden Springfield 0.129
Clark Las Vegas 0.114 Clark Las Vegas 0.139
Erie Buffalo 0.324 Albany Albany-Schenectady-Troy 0.101
Mahoning Youngstown-Warren-Boardman 0.008 Erie Buffalo 0.041
Dauphin Harrisburg-Carlisle 0.004 Monroe Rochester 0.220
Lehigh Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton 0.053 Mahoning Youngstown-Warren-Boardman 0.139
Hidalgo McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr 0.115 Utah Provo-Orem 0.122
Utah Provo-Orem 0.227
Richmond Augusta-Richmond 0.401
Richmond Augusta-Richmond 0.063 Orleans New Orleans 0.106
Orleans New Orleans 0.133 Mahoning Youngstown-Warren-Boardman 0.145
Clark Las Vegas 0.257 Lackawanna Scranton-Wilkes-Barre 0.225
Mahoning Youngstown-Warren-Boardman 0.137 Lehigh Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton 0.123
Lackawanna Scranton-Wilkes-Barre 0.112
Hidalgo McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr 0.298
Note:   synthetic control weights for construction of synthetic control gap plots. One treated county from each population decile of the Brazil and Kirk sample was selected for 
synthetic control analysis. To produce synthetic control series of the alcohol-related traffic fatalities variable, all potential donor data is smoothed with a 3-month moving 
average. An optimization function selects an optimal group of county units and their associated weights that minimize the distance between the pre-treatment period plot of the 
treated county series and the pre-treatment plot of the synthetic county. This table specifies the counties and weights that make up each synthetic version of a treated county for 
presentation as a plot. 
New York County
Atlanta
San Diego
San Antonio
Hartford
Virginia Beach
Worchester
Little Rock
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Figure 1: Pre−Period Trends Before Ride−Hailing Launch 
Plot of Coefficients from Regression of 
Fatality Count on Launch Time in Months 
Controls for Month−Year and County
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Figure 2: Pre−Period Trends Before Ride−Hailing Launch 
Plot of Coefficients from Regression of 
Fatality Rate on Launch Time in Months 
Controls for Month−Year and County
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Figure 3: Histograms Comparing Brazil and Kirk Treatment and Control Groups 
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Figure 4: Synthetic Control Gap Plots by Decreasing MSA Population Decile 
3-Month Moving Average, Alcohol-Related Fatality Rate 
 
 
 
 
Note: fatality rates use county-level population as a denominator. These counties were chosen from each of 
the MSA-population deciles of the BK sample. Worcester, MA is shown instead of Fairfield, CT because 
Connecticut is already represented by Hartford in the previous decile of this figure. 
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Table 1.1: Brazil and Kirk Sample Counties - Control Group
County State MSA
Multnomah Oregon Portland 2232079 NA NA 27
Clark Nevada Las Vegas 1953263 NA NA 35
Santa Clara California San Jose 1842462 NA NA 38
Orleans Louisiana New Orleans 1195794 NA NA 50
Erie New York Buffalo 1135342 NA NA 52
Jefferson Alabama Birmingham 1129034 NA NA 53
Monroe New York Rochester 1080082 NA NA 55
Albany New York Albany-Schenectady-Troy 870954 NA NA 64
Lehigh Pennsylvania Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton 822083 NA NA 71
Hidalgo Texas McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr 779194 NA NA 75
Onondaga New York Syracuse 662976 NA NA 83
Hampden Massachusetts Springfield 623426 NA NA 87
Ada Idaho Boise 617923 NA NA 89
Weber Utah Ogden 599569 NA NA 93
Polk Iowa Des Moines 571883 NA NA 95
Richmond Georgia Augusta-Richmond 566683 NA NA 97
Mahoning Ohio Youngstown-Warren-Boardman 564874 NA NA 98
Lackawanna Pennsylvania Scranton-Wilkes-Barre 563655 NA NA 99
Dauphin Pennsylvania Harrisburg-Carlisle 550258 NA NA 100
Utah Utah Provo-Orem 529830 NA NA 102
Pop Rank
Note:  this table contains the names of counties in Brazil and Kirk's control group, along with associated state, metropolitan statistical area (MSA), MSA population, and the rank of that MSA's 
population in the sample.
MSA Population
Deployment 
Month
Deployment 
Year
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Table 1.2: Brazil and Kirk Sample Counties - Treated Group
County State MSA
Bronx New York New York 19599534 5 2011 1
Kings New York New York 19599534 5 2011 2
New York New York New York 19599534 5 2011 3
Queens New York New York 19599534 5 2011 4
Richmond New York New York 19599534 5 2011 5
Los Angeles California Los Angeles 12845311 3 2012 6
Cook Illinois Chicago 9470069 9 2011 7
Dallas Texas Dallas 6452725 9 2012 8
Philadelphia Pennsylvania Philadelphia 5971276 6 2012 9
Harris Texas Houston 5949076 2 2014 10
District of Columbia District of Columbia Washington 5665931 12 2011 11
Miami-Dade Florida Miami 5586506 6 2014 12
Fulton Georgia Atlanta 5304207 8 2012 13
Suffolk Massachusetts Boston 4564659 10 2011 14
San Francisco California San Francisco 4345179 5 2010 15
Wayne Michigan Detroi 4291176 3 2013 16
Riverside California Riverside 4244242 5 2014 17
Maricopa Arizona Phoenix 4209347 11 2012 18
Kings Washington Seattle 3448234 8 2011 19
Hennepin Minnesota Minneapolis - St. Paul 3355105 10 2012 20
San Diego California San Diego 3104534 6 2012 21
St. Louis Missouri St. Louis 2789886 10 2014 22
Hillsborough Florida Tampa 2789334 3 2014 23
Baltimore Maryland Baltimore 2715625 2 2013 24
Denver Colorado Denver 2554335 9 2012 25
Allegheny Pennsylvania Pittsburgh 2356678 3 2014 26
Mecklenburg North Carolina Charlotte 2223894 9 2013 28
Sacramento California Sacramento 2154382 2 2013 29
Bexar Texas San Antonio 2153255 3 2014 30
Orange Florida Orlando 2139686 6 2014 31
Hamilton Ohio Cincinnati 2117863 3 2014 32
Cuyahoga Ohio Cleveland 2075558 4 2014 33
Jackson Missouri Kansas City 2013651 5 2014 34
Frnaklin Ohio Columbus 1906177 12 2013 36
Marion Indiana Indianapolis 1892508 6 2014 37
Travis Texas Austin 1727743 6 2014 39
Virginia Beach Virginia Virginia Beach 1680110 5 2014 40
Davidson Tennessee Nashville 1675913 12 2013 41
Providence Rhode Island Providence 1602154 7 2013 42
Milwaukee Wisconsin Milwaukee 1556535 4 2014 43
Duval Florida Jacksonville 1349137 1 2014 44
Shelby Tennessee Memphis 1326580 4 2014 45
Oklahoma Oklahoma Oklahoma City 1257888 10 2013 46
Jefferson Kentucky Louisville 1237778 4 2014 47
Hartford Connecticut Hartford 1214021 4 2014 48
Richmond Virginia Richmond 1210063 8 2014 49
Wake North Carolina Raleigh 1137346 6 2014 51
Salt Lake Utah Salt Lake City 1091432 5 2014 54
Kent Michigan Grand Rapids 989205 7 2014 56
Pima Arizona Tucson 981935 10 2013 57
Honolulu Hawaii Honolulu 956336 8 2013 58
Tulsa Oklahoma Tulsa 939858 3 2014 59
Fresno California Fresno 932642 2 2014 60
Fairfield Connecticut Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk 919506 4 2014 61
Worcester Massachusetts Worcester 918791 10 2014 62
Bernalillo New Mexico Albuquerque 889649 4 2014 63
Douglas Nebraska Omaha 868113 5 2014 65
New Haven Connecticut New Haven 863367 4 2014 66
Kern California Bakersfield 841762 6 2014 67
Knox Tennessee Knoxville 838687 8 2014 68
Greenville South Carolina Greenville 825765 7 2014 69
Ventura California Oxnard 825353 7 2014 70
El Paso Texas El Paso 807089 6 2014 72
East Baton Rouge Louisiana Baton Rouge 804491 7 2014 73
Montgomery Ohio Dayton 800245 8 2014 74
Richland South Carolina Columbia 769661 7 2014 76
Guilford North Carolina Greensboro 725040 6 2014 77
Sarasota Florida Sarasota 703462 12 2014 78
Summit Ohio Akron 702967 8 2014 79
Pulaski Arkansas Little Rock 702305 11 2014 80
San Joaquin California Stockton 687513 5 2014 81
Charleston South Carolina Charleston 667724 7 2014 82
El Paso Colorado Colorado Springs 650351 5 2014 84
Forsyth North Carolina Winston-Salem 641351 6 2014 85
Sedgwick Kansas Wichita 631936 8 2014 86
Lee Florida Cape Coral - Fort Myers 620521 12 2014 88
Lucas Ohio Toledo 610201 6 2014 90
Dane Wisconsin Madison 606409 3 2014 91
Polk Florida Lakeland 603359 12 2014 92
Volusia Florida Deltona-Daytona-Beach-Ormond Beach 590678 12 2014 94
Hinds Mississippi Jacksonville 568905 12 2014 96
Brevard Florida Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville 544029 12 2014 101
Hamilton Tennessee Chattanooga 529103 11 2014 103
Durham North Carolina Durham 508063 6 2014 104
Pop Rank
Note:  this table contains the names of counties in Brazil and Kirk's treatment group, along with associated state, metropolitan statistical area (MSA), MSA population, the month and year of the 
location's ride-hailing launch, and the rank of that MSA's population in the sample.
MSA Population
Deployment 
Month
Deployment 
Year
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Table 4.1 Changes to Treatment Variable from Brazil and Kirk Sample
City
Brazil & Kirk 
Status Change
San Jose, California untreated treated June 2014
Augusta-Richmond, Georgia untreated treated April 2015
Boise, Idaho untreated treated October 2014
Des Moines, Iowa untreated treated September 2014
New Orleans, Louisiana untreated treated April 2015
Springfield, Massachusetts untreated treated April 2015
Las Vegas, Nevada untreated treated September 2015
Portland, Oregon untreated treated December 2014
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, Pennsylvania untreated treated January 2015
Scranton-Wilkes_barre, Pennsylvania untreated treated February 2015
McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr, Texas untreated treated April 2015
Ogden, Utah untreated treated September 2015
Note:  table lists all locations in the Brazil and Kirk control group and the date they were eventually treated 
through a launch of ride-hailing services. To confirm the construction of Brazil and Kirk's data sample, I 
noted each location in the Brazil and Kirk "untreated" (control) group and searched for Uber press releases 
and articles in the press indicating a ride-hailing launch. While all of the "untreated" locations eventually 
experienced a ride-hailing launch, only four of these fall in Brazil and Kirk's original sample timeframe: 
San Jose, Boise, Des Moines, and Portland. The other locations are only applicable in a longer sample 
timeframe.
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CHAPTER 4: GRADUATED LICENSING REVISION AND YOUTH ROAD FATALITIES IN 
AUSTRALIA 
 
Graduated driver licensing (GDL) laws swept through Australia from 1989 to 2003, inserting 
a provisional license stage between the learner’s permit and an unrestricted driver’s license. This 
new three-step process (learner’s, provisional, and full license) sought to reduce the number of 
youth road fatalities, as youths contribute disproportionately to the road-fatality rate.37 In 1986, 
before these GDL policies were implemented, the death rate for Australian youths aged 12-24 
due to transport accidents was 31 per 100,000 persons. By 2005 that rate dropped to 10 per 
100,000 persons.38 In 2005, transport accidents accounted for 30 percent of the youth total 
fatality rate, and 44 percent of the youth injury fatality rate.39 The characteristics of the GDL 
schemes differed between the Australian states and territories (Western Australia, Northern 
Territory, Queensland, New South Wales, South Australia, Victoria, Australian Capital Territory, 
and Tasmania) but they all eventually implemented this 3-stage progression.  
Beyond establishing a 3-stage program, GDL schemes often include a mandatory log of 
instructor or parent training hours during the learner’s permit, or initial, phase. The provisional, 
or middle, phase often restricts novice drivers to daylight hours, bans distracting electronic 
devices from their vehicles, imposes higher fines for speeding or drinking, and caps the number 
of peer passengers allowed in the vehicle. These bans and restrictions may be introduced within 
                                                
37 For example, the Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads’ report on 2004 Road Traffic Crashes 
states that 17-24-year-olds comprised 12 percent of the state’s population, but 28.3 percent of road fatalities, with a 
road fatality rate roughly three times that of the population of the state.  
38 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, “Injury Among Young Australians” May 2008. Approximately 90 
percent of transport fatalities are motor vehicle fatalities. In 2005 there were 1,401 total youth fatalities, 954 of 
which were injury deaths, and 419 of which were transport accidents.  
39 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare special report Young Australians: Their Health and Wellbeing (2011). 
Transport deaths were 35 percent of the broader “injury and poisoning deaths” category, which accounts for 66 
percent of total deaths in this age group.  
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the framework of a 3-step GDL scheme. As was the case with Australia, these bans or 
restrictions may be applied to a GDL licensing phase later, after the initial GDL scheme and 
restrictions have been in place for some years. In this study, I estimate the effect of delayed GDL 
restrictions on fatalities among novice drivers, independent of the initial GDL setup, and find no 
measurable effect. 
Studies on GDL programs show widespread reductions in fatal collisions for 15-17-year-olds 
after their implementation.40 Ulmer et al. (2000), Foss et al. (2001), and Dee, Grabowski and 
Morrisey (2005) all show decreases in teen crashes when GDL systems are implemented. 
Karaca-Mandic and Ridgeway (2010) find that GDL programs reduce fatalities by shielding 
novice drivers from high risk driving environments during their learning phase, rather than 
imparting any training from increased attention or action. They depict the driver’s learning 
mechanism as a function of time in the driver’s seat, but not of any restrictions or requirements.  
If GDL schemes provide a window of reduced collision risk during novice drivers’ learning 
period, but cannot accelerate the pace of learning, there are direct implications for how 
policymakers design and implement GDL training programs. The effect of the 3-tier GDL 
program and the effect of a new training restriction within that program are impossible to 
distinguish if both are implemented at the same time. If the GDL scheme is introduced first and 
the training restrictions are introduced later, however, the change may identify the effect of the 
training restrictions separately from the effect of the GDL scheme.  
Ehsani, Bingham, and Shope (2013) use time series methods to demonstrate that in a state-
by-state analysis some, but not all, U.S. states saw a decrease in driver fatalities from 
implementing requirement for 30 supervised logbook hours. Requiring a minimum number of 
                                                
40 Shope (2007) is a review of GDL results since 2002. 
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logged driver training hours with a parent or instructor is a commonly-implemented training 
component in the first (learner’s) GDL stage. When Ehsani et al. pool the states in their analysis, 
however, the magnitude of the effect decreases to an insignificant level. They conclude that the 
6-month learner’s permit holding period had a significant effect but implementing a 30-hour 
logbook requirement did not. This is consistent with a mechanism in which the GDL is helpful in 
shielding the novice driver from risk during the adjustment period, but requiring a logbook either 
lacks salience and enforcement, or fails to produce a measurable change in driver behavior. 
From 2005 to 2008, some Australian states revised their established GDL schemes, adding 
requirements or restrictions to the learner or provisional-license stage of its GDL scheme.41 
Table 1 lists the Australian states and territories’ dates of initial GDL implementation as well as 
which states and territories implemented revisions. The approximate date of revision marks the 
beginning of a series of revisions in the case where the state or territory has implemented a series 
of restrictions or requirements spanning several years. The first column of Table 1 shows the 
timing of the initial 3-tier GDL implementation, and the second column shows the date of the 
implementation of more rigorous training and higher standards for novice drivers. The complete 
timeline of policy changes potentially affecting youth automobile road fatalities is in Appendix 
1.  
While each state or territory’s timeline and implemented restrictions are different, some 
common policy categories exist between the state policy revisions. First, Queensland, Victoria, 
and New South Wales (NSW) lengthened the first-tier learner’s (L-plate) permit period from 6 
months to 12 months. This policy change allowed novice drivers to practice with a parent or 
                                                
41 Senserrick (2007) gives a description of the legal changes from 2007, and includes a helpful set of tables 
itemizing the characteristics of each Australian state’s graduated licensing features for the learner and provisional 
levels.  
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instructor in the vehicle for a longer period of time, acquire supervised experience on the full 
range of different road or weather conditions, and gain further maturity.  
Second, the number of required supervised practice hours were increased. Learner’s permit 
holders and their instructors document these hours and submit a logbook or a signed statement 
before moving to a second-stage provisional license. South Australia introduced 50 hours of 
required supervised driving, including 10 nighttime hours. Queensland introduced a 100-hour 
supervised driving requirement. Victoria implemented a 120-hour requirement, including 10 
nighttime hours. NSW increased the supervised practice-hours requirement from 50 hours to 120 
hours.  
Third, learners’ performance both on exams and in vehicles was held to a higher standard 
than before. NSW increased the difficulty of the examination separating learners from 2nd tier 
“provisional” license holders (commonly called “P-platers” for the letter “P” placards that 
provisional drivers are required to display). NSW implemented a zero-tolerance speeding policy 
for learners, which would result in a 3-month license suspension for infractions. Queensland, 
NSW, Northern Territory, and Victoria introduced a ban of all cell-phone use for learners to 
encourage more focused driving behavior.  
Fourth, in addition to changes for learners, some states implemented restrictions and 
heightened supervision for second-tier provisional license drivers (P-plate drivers). South 
Australia, Victoria, Queensland, and Tasmania divided their provisional license period into two 
stages (P1 and P2). Victoria and Queensland implemented a hazard perception test required to 
pass from P1 to P2. Queensland and NSW restricted P1 drivers to only one peer passenger late at 
night. NSW included P1 drivers in its zero-tolerance speeding policy. Queensland, NSW, and 
Victoria banned all cell phone use for P1 drivers. Victoria and Tasmania also increased the 
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aggregate length of the provisional stage, which had the effect of marginally increasing the age 
of an unrestricted license. 
These secondary changes to the state GDL laws increased intensity and supervision of driver 
training. While no learners’ stage increased by more than 6 months, that change constitutes a 100 
percent increase in the months a novice driver was required to be accompanied by an adult to 
drive. Though it constitutes an unsupervised portion of the novice driver’s learning period, 
changes to the timeline of the provisional license stage resulted in a delay of a year or more to a 
full driver’s license in some cases. Survey data from Queensland suggests that there was no 
change in licensed driver count after the new logged-hours requirements, so the new policy 
neither discouraged youths from joining the novice-driver population nor prevented novice 
drivers from moving on to a provisional license.42 These policies increased a “training intensity” 
component of novice-driver training through enforced practice and greater novice-driver 
scrutiny, rather than increasing novice-driver learning.  
In this study, I argue that the states’ increased burden of testing and enforcement costs did 
not yield measurable improvements in youth road fatality outcomes. Despite the states’ effort 
and cost, more intense training for novice drivers did not lead to lower youth road fatalities in the 
Australian states that implemented these additional restrictions. I find no robust effect of the 
revision of graduated licensing laws on the count or rate of automobile fatalities involving novice 
drivers. Using a difference-in-difference-in-differences approach, I estimate the effect of the 
policy on the count of fatal collisions involving a young (16-21-year-old) driver and find no 
statistically significant effect. Identification rests on the variation of GDL training policy 
                                                
42 Scott-Parker et al (2011) use survey data of learners (first-tier) who have just finished their provisional license 
exam, both before and after the 2007 law change. 68.2 percent of their post-2007 sample gains a provisional license 
on the first try, an increase from 61.5 percent before the 2007 law change and the mean number of attempts to gain a 
provisional license did not change.  
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implementation across driver cohorts, over time, by state. I also use an aggregated difference-in-
difference-in-differences approach comparing the cohort of 16-21-year-olds to never-treated 28-
33-year-olds. I find one specification with a marginally significant, positive effect, which is not 
robust to changes in the length of the sample timeframe or the makeup of the cross-sectional 
units. While the lack of a negative and significant effect in the Australian road fatalities data 
might stem from issues of enforcement, salience, or other dampening effects, the lack of 
measurable effect might also signal that a different approach to youth road fatalities is warranted 
in these regions instead. Time, not intensity of training, may be the more effective intervention. 
Section 1 details the data sources used in this study. Section 2 describes the estimation 
strategy for the difference-in-difference-in-differences models. Section 3 presents regression 
results for both models as well as robustness checks. Section 4 discusses conclusions, policy 
implications for legislatures, and external validity of this study.  
 
1. Data 
This study uses three data sources for estimation. The first is the Australian Road Deaths 
Database, maintained by the Australian Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport, and Regional 
Economics (BITRE) and collected by local police in each state and territory. This data set 
contains details of Australian traffic fatalities including location, time, number of vehicles 
involved, and information about the deceased persons (passenger or driver, age, gender). I have 
omitted any crashes involving buses or articulated trucks from the estimation: these types of fatal 
collisions are likely to have disproportionately many fatalities compared to the average vehicle 
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collision. Additionally, the training for bus and truck drivers comprises a separate and 
subsequent training period following attainment of a standard automobile driver’s license.43  
The sample from the Australian Road Deaths Database includes observations from 1989 
through 2015. The specifications detailed in the estimation section below use two different 
sample time periods. The first sample period excludes all observations before 2003 to omit 
possibly-confounding policy changes, producing a sample from 2003 through 2015. Because 
2003 is the last year in which an Australian state (South Australia) introduced its initial 3-stage 
GDL process, this first timeline fits a model on all states and territories, but with a shorter 
timeline.  
The second sample period extends from 1994, the year that the Northern Territory (the 
penultimate GDL adopter) introduced a 3-stage GDL. During this 1994-2015 period, South 
Australia both implemented its initial 3-stage GDL and also several revisions, compromising the 
identification of the revision effect. For this reason, South Australia is omitted from the second 
sample period. Extending the sample period back to 1994 instead of 2003 allows for model 
fitting on a longer pre-period timeline, but at the cost of omitting one Australian state from the 
analysis. 
South Australia is not fundamentally different from the other states in terms of its driving 
safety or the proportion of its population that drives. Leaving it out of the analysis should not 
                                                
43 For example South Australia (http://mylicence.sa.gov.au/my-heavy-vehicle-licence), Victoria 
(https://www.vicroads.vic.gov.au/licences/licence-and-permit-types/heavy-vehicle-licence/how-to-get-a-heavy-
vehicle-licence), Western Australia (http://www.transport.wa.gov.au/licensing/heavy-rigid-licence-hr.asp), 
Queensland (https://www.qld.gov.au/transport/licensing/driver-licensing/upgrading/), New South Wales 
(http://www.rms.nsw.gov.au/business-industry/heavy-vehicles/licence/index.html), Northern Territory 
(https://nt.gov.au/driving/heavy/get-your-heavy-vehicle-licence/apply-for-heavy-rigid-licence-hr), Tasmania 
(http://www.transport.tas.gov.au/licensing/getting-a-licence) and ACT 
(https://www.accesscanberra.act.gov.au/app/answers/detail/a_id/1626/~/heavy-vehicle-driver-licensing) have 
separate license classes and training paths for bus and truck drivers. These linked resources last seen September 13, 
2017.  
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induce selection bias. South Australia is in the middle of the population ranking of all the 
Australian states and territories, and the second largest in order of land mass. Adelaide is the fifth 
most populous Australian city and houses most of the South Australia’s population.44 While 
Adelaide has a tram network, driving is the most common transport form. Given that the nearest 
major city is 800 miles from Adelaide, South Australians should not differ in their driving 
experience and behavior from drivers in the rest of the Australian population.    
The road fatalities data includes some characteristics of the road users who were killed in the 
collision. Unlike some data sources used for traffic policy analysis in the U.S., there is no data 
available for arbitrary road users involved in the fatal crash: only information on the fatally-
injured person or persons is available. The fault or not-at-fault status of the driver is not available 
in this data: only the deceased road-user’s role, gender, and age are provided. From this data, I 
construct a single-age driver fatality count by state for crashes with drivers between age 16 and 
21 (e.g.: one observation is the number of crashes in New South Wales in 2003 involving a 16-
year-old driver fatality). The constraints of the data set imply that collisions in which a 16-year-
old was a driver, but not a fatality, are not reflected in the sample. 
While the set of all fatalities that occurred in a crash in which a single age group comprised 
the drivers would be a more appropriate data set, it is not available. Nevertheless, the set of 
crashes where a single age group represent fatally-injured drivers forms a subset of the ideal data 
set and should not be systematically biased. Conditional on being in a collision, it is unlikely that 
any driver would be able to influence whether she, her passenger, or both were fatally injured in 
the crash. Given the tendency for nearly all Australians to learn to drive at approximately the 
                                                
44 In 1993, the state and territory population rankings were: NSW 6 million, Victoria 4.5 million, Queensland 3.1 
million, Western Australia 1.7 million, South Australia 1.5 million, Tasmania 472,000, Australian Capital Territory 
299,000, and Northern Territory 168,000. (Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics state summary tables of social 
trends 4102.0)  
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same age, any peer-passenger laws would shift road users from the passenger role to the driver 
role, but would not remove them from the set of road users. 
 The date information associated with each collision allows for fatality counts aggregated by 
year, with 22 years, six single-age groups, and eight Australian states and territories. Gender 
indicators allow for separate estimation of males and females.45 Traffic fatalities in Australia are 
consistently twice as prevalent for males than females.46 Studies have shown systematically 
lower rates of collisions and lower policy effects for women, especially regarding alcohol-related 
offenses.47 The analysis that follows will include crashes involving both males and females to 
retain as much signal as possible.   
The second data source is the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ population census estimate of 
residents by age, gender, and state, released in June each year.48 I use the population either as a 
control variable or as the denominator in the construction of a fatality rate.  
The third data source in this study is a timeline of GDL policy changes across the Australian 
states and territories. I compiled these changes based on collected newspaper articles, 
government announcements, academic studies, and consulting reports to determine the treatment 
date for each state. Using this policy timeline, I note the date when each state and territory has 
enacted a GDL revision. This timeline also shows that South Australia is the last state to 
implement a 3-tier graduated licensing system, and consequently I use this last GDL 
                                                
45 Observations with no gender indicator are omitted from the analysis. While I have fit all regressions with 
separated genders for robustness, I present only result tables from the “all persons” construction of the outcome 
variable, because I find no difference between the results for “males only” and “all persons.” 
46 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, “Injury Among Young Australians” May 2008. 
47 Kaestner and Yarnoff (2011) find that lower minimum drinking ages reduce alcohol use and traffic fatalities in 
males but not females. Carpenter (2004) finds that zero-tolerance drunk-driving laws for underage drivers reduced 
binge-drinking by 13 percent for males, and mixed evidence for females, but no robust effects on drunk-driving 
outcomes for either sex.  
48 This data is released as catalog number 3101.0 available from www.abs.gov.au last seen October 13, 2017. 
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implementation date as the start of the time-series estimation sample to avoid confounding the 
effect of initial GDL structure with the effect of a GDL revision.49  
 
2. Estimation Strategy 
I exploit the variation in treatment over time, state, and age from Australian GDL revisions. 
This policy timing allows for difference-in-difference-in-differences estimation. Each state and 
territory’s legislature took up the issue of driver training revisions on their own schedule. New 
policies affected new cohorts of novice drivers in each state after the GDL revision, but did not 
alter the restrictions on cohorts that had already begun their training. Comparing older drivers to 
novice drivers over time allows for an aggregated difference-in-difference-in-differences 
estimation.50 The policy revision is plausibly exogenous to population movements, as it is 
unlikely that young drivers could select into or out of the policy by leaving or entering the state 
in large numbers, since novice drivers are typically minors who live with a parent or guardian.  
Figure 1 shows fatality rates plotted in terms of time from the policy revision. The policy 
revisions were not implemented in a purely reactionary fashion. The lack of bunching before the 
“zero-point” vertical line suggests that GDL revisions were not implemented endogenously in 
states and times after or because of a particularly-high fatality rate year. Figure 2 shows fatality 
rates over time for each Australian state.  
The following difference-in-difference-in-differences estimates will consider 16-year-olds as 
the first treated age group after the policy revision, as this is typically the first full year of 
supervised driver training in Australia. Each subsequent year after the implementation of the 
                                                
49 This timeline was constructed with information available as of 2016. This timeline and description of the policies 
implemented can be found in Appendix 1. The effect significance from estimation including or excluding South 
Australia is robust, though the magnitude and sign are not.  
50 Carpenter (2006) presents similar methodology and research question, examining a zero BAC restriction on 
novice drivers in Canada. 
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policy will add an additional age group to those who have received the intervention. As some 
states allow 15-year-olds to begin supervised driver training and some do not, the effect on 15-
year-olds will not be considered to avoid comparison to states where it is not legal for 15-year-
olds to drive. For clarity, Table 1 indicates the treated group in each state over a selection of 
years contiguous to the policy changes.51  𝐹#VW = 𝛼 + 𝑋V)	𝛽 + 𝑇#)	𝛾 + 𝐴W) 	𝛿 + 𝜁	𝑃𝑜𝑝#VW + 𝜂	𝑂𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟V# + 𝜃	𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑#VW + 𝜖#VW			 1  
Equation 1 is the estimating equation for the difference-in-difference-in-differences 
regression of policy revisions on youth fatalities. F is the outcome variable, representing either 
fatality counts or a fatality rate in each state, time period, and age group. In the results section I 
present estimates using both outcome measures. The fatal crash count represents the number of 
crashes in which a single age of driver was a fatality in a given state and time period. The fatality 
rate represents fatalities of drivers in a single age group per 100,000 residents of that single age 
in each state and time period. When count rather than rate is used as an outcome variable, I 
include a population control for each single-age group. X is a vector of state fixed effects to 
control for non-time-varying differences between Australian states and territories. T is a vector of 
yearly fixed effects to control for effects that are common across states but vary by time. A is a 
vector of age fixed effects for each single-age group. As a control for state-level time-varying 
effects like weather that would affect all drivers regardless of age, I include a fatality count or 
rate for older drivers between 25 and 50 years old. This variable may also pick up general trends 
in road collisions over time that affect all drivers regardless of age. The treatment variable is a 
binary variable equal to one for each affected age group in the time periods after a policy change 
in a particular state.  
                                                
51 The timeline used to determine these policy dates is presented in Appendix 1. 
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 In addition to this specification that takes advantage of variation in treatment by age, I 
have estimated an average difference-in-difference-in-differences effect between two aggregated 
age groups: the first group contains 16- to 21-year-olds of the previous section and the second 
group contains 28-33 year-olds who are never treated in any state or territory during the sample 
period.52 This second, older group constitutes the youngest comparison group in the sample for 
which some treated drivers do not age into the group during the sample period. For this 
specification, I omit the older-age-group benchmark control variable, as this model already 
compares to the fatality rate or fatality count of an untreated group of drivers.  
 I expect that there is serial correlation between observations within the same state or 
territory, so I estimate wild-bootstrap standard errors for all specifications. Cameron, Gelbach, 
and Miller (2008) discuss the importance of a threshold of at least 10 clusters, below which 
standard methods produce artificially small standard errors. Because there are eight Australian 
states and territories specified in the Australian government’s fatality and population data, the 
number of clusters is too small to rely on standard cluster-robust standard errors. I use Cameron, 
Gelbach, and Miller’s wild-bootstrap methodology with 100 repetitions, using a Rademacher 
distribution to assign a weight of -1 or 1 to residuals by cluster, adding the resulting value to the 
fitted values, and calculating a standard error.53  
 
3. Results 
I estimate the difference-in-difference-in-differences effects discussed in Section 2 on the 
Australian traffic fatality data discussed in Section 1, resulting in the regression coefficients in 
                                                
52 This is similar to the methodology Dee, Grabowski, and Morrisey (2005) use to measure the effect of initial GDL 
implementations across U.S. states.  
53 I use Graham, Arai, and Hagströmer’s R package, “multiwaycov” which may be accessed here: 
http://sites.google.com/site/npgraham1/research/code, most recently seen September 13, 2017.  
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Tables 3 and 4. In Table 3, the estimated treatment effect under several specifications, with both 
sample timelines, is generally not statistically significant and the sign of the treatment effect is 
often positive. The two specifications using the shorter time period and fatality count outcome 
show statistically significant effects, but the magnitude is small and positive. The two 
specifications using the longer time period and the fatality rate outcome are negative, but small 
in magnitude and not statistically significant. Governmental policies that are structured to 
improve novice-driver training usually intend to produce a negative effect on youth road 
fatalities rather than a positive effect.54 Because it is unlikely that a causal link exists between the 
training program changes and increased traffic fatality outcomes, these results suggest that the 
increased intensity of GDL programs across Australian states and territories had no measurable 
effect on youth traffic fatality outcomes.  
In Table 4, I present the estimated traffic fatality effects of GDL revision on an aggregated 
cohort of novice drivers compared to an aggregated older cohort of older drivers that is never 
treated. These difference-in-difference-in-differences effects vary in size and sign but none are 
statistically significant at a 10 percent level. This outcome supports the hypothesis that increased 
training intensity did not measurably reduce traffic fatalities for novice drivers. 
These results are consistent with Ehsani, Bingham, and Shope’s (2013) study on U.S. data, in 
which a structured waiting and learning period decreases the novice-driver fatality rate, but 
mandating a driving-hours log during that waiting and learning period does not affect the novice-
driver fatality rate. The Australian states and territories in this study similarly implement log 
books of required hours, but also include peer-passenger restrictions, cell phone bans, speed-
                                                
54 A similar effect is found in Carpenter (2006). Without controlling for underlying trends, Carpenter’s effects are 
negative and significant, but adding time trends makes the effects either small and insignificant or large and positive 
(the “wrong” sign for the effect he measures).  
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limit restrictions, and daylight-hours restrictions. This expanded list of individual restrictions did 
not measurably decrease novice-driver fatality counts or rates in Australian states and territories.  
These estimation results rest on the assumption that the media reporting I have summarized 
about the roll-out of each policy across states is correct both in content and timing. Additionally, 
the estimation results are valid only if the Australian road-fatality data is not systematically 
biased. There is no indication that this is the case. While some of the fatality observations may 
be missing or misclassified, I assume the data quality is high and omissions occur randomly if at 
all. Considering the large number of driver-licensing policy changes that Australian states have 
produced in the last twenty years, the treated and untreated groups may not be appropriate 
counterfactual comparison groups for each other. Aside from these caveats, I must conclude that 
the novice-driver revisions to Australian graduated licensing laws had little or no measurable 
effect.  
 
4. Discussion 
In this study, I examine the empirical effect of revisions to the graduated licensing laws in 
some Australian states and territories on youth traffic fatalities. I estimate several specifications 
of a difference-in-difference-in-differences model using traffic-fatality data. I find no significant 
effect of increased driver training and scrutiny in this case. I cannot determine whether this result 
stems from the inherent effectiveness of this increased “training intensity” intervention, or from 
indirect effects like poor enforcement or low salience. Despite the government’s depiction of its 
GDL revisions, it may be the case that there were other policy objectives apart from reducing 
traffic fatalities. These GDL revisions imposed significant effort and cost on new drivers and 
state driving authorities. If the government adequately enforced these new regulations and their 
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goal was reduced novice-driver fatalities, however, the resulting lack of reduction in youth traffic 
fatalities might warrant a reexamination of some GDL revisions in favor of extending the 
learner’s permit period.  
Australia’s large landmass and low relative population density suggest that this result is a 
good fit for some large, western U.S. states, and a poorer predictor for western Europe or the 
eastern seaboard of the U.S. Australia’s experience may be viewed as an extreme case, as driving 
collision risk should increase with vehicle miles travelled: if these bans and restrictions were 
particularly effective for frequent or high-mileage drivers, the effect on driver learning should be 
larger in Australia. The high level of license-holdership and potential automobile trips of 800 
miles between major cities should inflate any effect. The intense seasonal conditions, and 
potentially-destructive wildlife should additionally contribute to estimating a high-water mark of 
collision risk that traffic-fatality-reducing policies might alleviate. The lack of measurable result 
in this environment should signal that these policies lack traction for this population and may 
merit reevaluation. 
 Despite the null effect for bans and restrictions, studies like Dee et al. (2005) support the 
conclusion that graduated licensing programs are an effective public health policy. The lack of 
effect in Australian states only underscores that further research on the optimal learner’s permit 
length is merited. Additionally, the current state of virtual-reality technology suggests that some 
of the learner’s supervised-driving period might be well spent in an indoor virtual-training 
facility with zero risk rather than on the road with a small but non-zero risk. Determining the 
substitutability of supervised driving in a high-quality simulator versus training hours on the road 
should be a research priority, with cost, benefit, and public health implications for state 
governments.  
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Table 1: Timing of the Graduated Licensing Policies in Australia
Intial 3-Tier GDL 
Implementation
Primary GDL 
Revision (Treatment)
South Australia 2003 2006
Queensland 1991 2007
Victoria 1990 2007
Northern Territory 1994 2007
New South Wales 1966 2007
Tasmania 1991 2008
Australian Capital Territory 1993 N/A
Western Australia 1989 N/A
Note : this timeline of policy implementations in Australian States and Territories that 
may plausibly effect youth road fatalities. These dates and events were sourced from 
government memoranda, research reports, and online newspaper articles. Statements in 
some of these sources directly contradict each other, and have been subjectively 
selected based on publication date, tone and quantity of content, and cross checking 
with other sources where possible.
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Table 2: Visual Representation of the Treated and Untreated Comparison Groups by Age, State, and Year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Australian Capital Territory 16 16 16 16 16 16 South Australia 16 16 16 16 16 16
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
New South Wales 16 16 16 16 16 16 Tasmania 16 16 16 16 16 16
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Victoria
Northern Territory 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Queensland 16 16 16 16 16 16 Western Australia 16 16 16 16 16 16
17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Note : this chart illustrates how a revision in driver training laws in a state sequentially treats new drivers who begin their training in the year of the policy change. As cohorts age, more of the 
driver-age groups in a state are treated. For purposes of difference-in-difference estimation, the shaded single-age groups in each state and year are considered treated. To avoid issues of salience 
and enforcement, only single-age groups who began their driver training under the graduated licensing revisions are considered treated by the policy changes. Neither the Australian Capital 
Territory nor Western Australia appear to have experienced a graduated driver law revision during the period of examination, so they have no shading and are not considered treated by a graduated 
driver law revision in the analysis.
 100 
 
 
  
Table 3: Regression Results with Yearly Frequency Data
OLS Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences Estimates by Single Year of Age, 16-21-Year-Olds
Dependent Variable:
Treatment -0.45 -0.44 0.06 0.08
( 5.96 ) ( 5.87 ) ( 0.69 ) ( 0.65 )
[ 5.05 ] [ 4.50 ] [ 0.48 ] [ 0.54 ]
    Population of Target Age Y  
    Control for Age 25-50 Drivers Y  Y  
Dep. Var. Mean 9.92 9.92 3.12 3.12
Pct. Change -4.56 % -4.46 % 1.81 % 2.54 %
Adj. R-Sq. 0.29 0.28 0.58 0.59
N 924 924 924 924
Treatment 4.49 4.51 1.34 * 1.35 **
( 4.91 ) ( 4.76 ) ( 0.96 ) ( 0.87 )
[ 3.72 ] [ 3.46 ] [ 0.73 ] [ 0.63 ]
    Population of Target Age Y  
    Control for Age 25-50 Drivers Y  Y  
Dep. Var. Mean 7.34 7.34 2.40 2.40
Pct. Change 61.16 % 61.40 % 54.17 % 56.28 %
Adj. R-Sq. 0.22 0.22 0.50 0.51
N 624 624 624 624
Note:  OLS difference-in-difference estimates. State-clustered errors clustered are presented in parentheses and wild-
bootstrap state-clustered standard errors using a rademacher distribution and 100 repetitions are presented in square 
brackets. The top and bottom sections of this table contain estimates from separate sample timeframes; 1994 - 2015 
(longer time period, omitting South Australia) in the top section and 1993 - 2015 (shorter time period, including South 
Australia) to avoid South Australia's 2003 introduction of graduated licensing laws in the bottom section. Only collisions 
in which 16 - 21-year-olds constituted a fatality are observed and included in the dependent variable. Two forms of the 
dependent variable are presented in adjacent columns, either as a count or as a rate (constructed as fatalities per 100,000 
state residents of the target age in the given year). All specifications include state, year, and age-group fixed effects, as 
well as all interaction effects of these groupings. Specifications in which the dependent variable is a count instead of a 
rate control for age-group population. One specification for each dependent variable format controls for the 
corresponding count or rate of 25-50-year-olds as a state- or time-varying benchmark of driving risk due to behavioral 
norms or weather hazards. The results for a sample of males only does not differ from these results. Significance levels 
are indicated by * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01.
Longer Time Period, Omit One State
Shorter Time Period, All States and Territories
All Persons
Fatality Rate Fatality Count
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Table 4: Regression Results with Yearly Frequency Data
Dependent Variable:
Treatment -0.72 3.93 -9.44 0.93
( 5.57 ) ( 4.71 ) ( 10.38 ) ( 4.09 )
    Population of Target Age Y Y
Dep. Var. Mean 27.38 24.11 25.63 22.70
Pct. Change -2.62 % 16.30 % -36.81 % 4.09 %
Adj. R-Sq 0.84 0.78 0.85 0.81
N 308 308 208 208
Note: OLS difference-in-difference--in-differences estimates. State-clustered wild-bootstrap standard 
errors are presented in parentheses using a Rademacher distribution and 1,000 repetitions. The left and 
right sections of this table contain estimates from separate sample timeframes: estimates for 1994 - 2015 
(longer time period, omitting South Australia) are presented on the left and 2003 - 2015 (shorter time 
period, including South Australia) to avoid South Australia's 2003 introduction of graduated licensing 
laws are presented on the right. Only fatal collisions in which 16-21- and 28-33-year-olds drivers are a 
fatality are observed and included the dependent variable. Both fatality counts and rates (fatalities per 
100,000 residents of the target age group in that state and year) are provided. All specifications include 
state, year, and age-group fixed effects, as well as all interaction effects. Specifications in which the 
dependent variable is a count instead of a rate control for resident population of that age group. 
Significance levels are indicated by * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01.
OLS Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences Regression 
Between Age 16-21 Group and Age 28-33 Group
Longer Time Period, 
Omit One State
Shorter Time Period, 
All States
Fatality 
Rate
Fatality 
Count
Fatality 
Rate
Fatality 
Count
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Figure 1: Fatality Rates by Years-From-Policy 
States with Graduated Driver Licensing Revisions Only 
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Figure 2: Fatality Rates for Youths and Adult Populations 
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Appendix 1
 
Table 1.1: OLS Regression Results with Monthly Frequency Data
Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences by Single Year of Age, 16-21-Year-Olds
Dependent Variable:
Treatment -0.11 -0.11 < 0.01 < 0.01
(  0.51 ( 0.51 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.06 )
[ 0.39 ] [ 0.39 ] [ 0.05 ] [ 0.05 ]
    Population of Target Age Y  
    Control for Age 25-50 Drivers Y  Y  
Dep. Var. Mean 0.85 0.85 0.27 0.27
Pct. Change -13.17 % -13.20 % -0.34 % -0.36 %
Adj. R-Sq. 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.06
N 10836 10836 10836 10836
Treatment 0.31 0.31 0.10 0.10 *
( 0.42 ) ( 0.41 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.07 )
[ 0.35 ] [ 0.35 ] [ 0.06 ] [ 0.05 ]
    Population of Target Age Y  
    Control for Age 25-50 Drivers Y  Y  
Dep. Var. Mean 0.64 0.64 0.21 0.21
Pct. Change 48.86 % 48.77 % 49.90 % 48.86 %
Adj. R-Sq. < 0.01 < 0.01 0.05 0.07
N 7200 7200 7200 7200
Shorter Time Period, All States and Territories
Note: OLS difference-in-difference estimates using monthly-frequency data, rather than the yearly-frequency data 
used for the main paper results. State-clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. State-clustered wild-
bootstrap standard errors using a rademacher distribution and 100 repetitions are presented in square brackets. 
The top and bottom sections of this table contain estimates from separate sample timeframes; 1994 - 2015 (longer 
time period, omitting South Australia) in the top section and 1993 - 2015 (shorter time period, including South 
Australia) to avoid South Australia's 2003 introduction of graduated licensing laws in the bottom section. The 
significance of the estimates is robust to reversing the inclusion or exclusion of South Australia. Only collisions 
in which 16 - 21-year-olds constituted a fatality are observed and included in the dependent variable. Estimates 
from specifications from two dependent variable are presented in adjacent columns, either as a count or as a rate 
(constructed as fatalities per 100,000 state residents of the target age in the given year). All specifications include 
state, month-year, and age-group fixed effects, as well as all interaction terms. Specifications in which the 
dependent variable is a count instead of a rate control for population. One specification for each form of the 
dependent variable includes the fatality count or rate for 25-50-year-olds as a control for benchmark, state-
varying, time-varying driving risk due to behavioral norms or weather hazards. Significance levels are indicated 
by * < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01.
Longer Time Period, Omit One State
Fatality Rate Fatality Count
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Appendix 2 
Table 2.1: Timeline of State-Level Policy Changes 
 
New South Wales 
1-Jan-1966 
provisional system introduced, one year provisional license, display P 
plates, 80kmh speed limit, one offense license cancellation and further 
provisional license issued 
1-Feb-1982 learner permits expire after 12 months, written knowledge tests introduced 
25-Mar-1985 
P plates require knowledge test only after cancellation, P plates allowed 5 
demerit pionts before license cancellation, P plates dermerit points carry 
over to unrestricted license 
2-Apr-1985 .02 percent alcohol limit introduced for learners and P license holders, driver's supervisor cannot exceed .05 percent alcohol 
1-May-1987 introduction of probationary licenses (after violation, probationary license) 
1-Aug-1987 L and P platers may not tow vehicles 
10-Jan-1989 introduction of photo licenses, requirement for proof of identity, introduction of (physical) learner's licenses 
18-Dec-1989 introduction of 3 year demerit points scheme, 4 demerit points cause cancellation of P license 
20-Mar-1999 introduction of computerized knowledge tests 
1-Aug-1990 tenure (required holding period) of L license extended to 15 months, L 
license fee reduced to $10, driving test fee reduced to one test only. 
1-Jan-1991 .02 percent BAC limit for drivers under 25 if not held a license for more than 3 years 
1-Mar-1991 introduction of speed cameras 
July, 2007 
120 supervised practice hours required of learners increase from 50 to 120 
including 20 night hours, learner holding period up to 12 mo from 6 mo, no 
mobile phone use for driver including hands free for learner and P1, P1 
drivers under 25 restricted to 1 peer passenger between 11pm and 5am 
excluding family, P drivers cannot carry more than one passenger after 
disqualification for 12mo, P1 drivers caught speeding face 3mo license 
suspension 
November, 2012 mobile phones should be mounted or held by a passenger, no texting while driving 
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Victoria 
1969 
probationary license scheme introduced (80kmh speed limit in the first 12 
months, dipslay P plates for 12 months, loss of license for any offence other 
than driving an unroadworthy vehicle, driving a vehicle without prescribed 
lights and not indicating) 
May-1984 zero BAC law for learners, first year probationary, unlicensed or disqualified driver or rider 
Jul-1990 
introduction of graduated licensing scheme; learners driver permit at min 
16 years, pass a road law test, supervised by holder of full license, valid for 
3 years 
Aug-1990 
Red License (P plate) -- pass practical and theory tests, restriction on power 
to weight ratio, tonne or capacity weight ratio, new design P plate must be 
displayed (white on red background); Full License -- must have held red 
license continuously without conviction for 3 years, minimum 21 years old; 
compulsory carriage of license for probationary license holders or on the 
spot fine, required to pass computer-based hazard perception test to drive 
high power vehicles after the probationary period (proposal to remove this 
regulation approved in principle by ministry of transport June 1992), 
restriction to one passenger for 12 months after license restoration after a 
violation 
Feb-1994 introduction of hazard perception test in Geelong only, to become statewide by end 1994 
1-Jan-2007 alcohol interlock measures for probationary drink drivers under the age of 26 as a condition of license restoration 
1-Jul-2007 
12 month holding period for learners (increased from 6 months), 120 hours 
supervised driving experience including 10 night hours recorded in official 
diary (increased from zero required hours), mobile phone ban (even for 
hands-free) for learners 
1-Jul-2008 
increase the probationary period from three years to four years (P1 for one 
year and P2 for three years) for those under 21 replacing a single 3-year P 
license, ban on mobile phone use for P1 drivers, P1 drivers restricted from 
carrying more than one peer passenger if returning from license suspension, 
requirement for good driving record to graduate P1 and also P2, zero BAC 
restriction applies to P1 and P2, high powered vehicle restriction for 
probationary (P1 and P2) drivers, practical drive test more rigorous than 
previously 
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South Australia 
1980 probationary licensing introduced 
6-Jun-1981 0.05 percent BAC limit for probationary drivers introduced 
15-Oct-1981 Random Breathalizer Testing introduced 
before 1986 zero BAC limit for learner and probationary drivers 
May-1987 commencement of increased level of random breathalyzer testing and publicity about drunk driving 
1988 
increase in license age from 16 to 16+6-months, minimum 1 year 
probationary license or until 19 years old, speed limit for probationary 
increased from 80 to 100kmh, change in learner permit fee from $14 for 3 
months followed by $7 per extra 3 months to $8 per three months 
1-Apr-1993 learners may take a course in which topics are taught and retaught until 
student demonstrates proficiency -- no pass/fail test structure 
2003 
6 month holding period on L permit, 2 year holding period on P license, 
road safety questions included in L permit theory test, pass level raised on 
L permit theory test from 75 to 80 
2006 
50 hours supervised driving for L drivers (including 10 at night), 
introduction of provisional P1 and P2 stages, introduction of hazard 
perception test in order to progress from P1 to P2, fast-track options to P2 - 
driver awareness course or 12m demerit free options, serious 
disqualification offense created, curfew for disqualified drivers began. 
These provisions were introduced in South Australia in 2005 as part of a 
suite of GLS changes and came into effect on 31 October 2006. 
2006 
introduction of regression to former license stage for disqualified learner's 
permit and P drivers, includes re-passing any tests associated with previous 
license stage 
2009 L and P drivers banned from any form of mobile phone use while driving 
2010 
increased holding period for learner's permit increases from 6 months to 12 
months for drivers under 25, increased supervised driving requirement for 
learner's permit holders to 75 hours including 15 at night, court required to 
consider a client's driving record before determining an appeal, tightening 
of curfew condition for novice drivers returning from a serious 
disqualification (no passengers other than a qualified supervisory driver), 
introduced safer driver agreement option for disqualified provisional 
drivers (double or nothing?), increased maximum speed limit for learners 
from 80kmh to 100kmh, 2 demerit points instead of license disqualification 
for failure to display L/P plates, P1 and P2 drivers under 25 no high 
powered vehicles 
2014 
P1 drivers under 25 banned from driving between midnight and 5am 
(unless qualified supervising driver), P1 under 25 banned from carrying 
more than one 16-20 aged passenger at any time (except family, unless 
there is a QSD present), hazard pereception test now precedes P! license 
instead of P2 license, provisional license is now 1 year on P1 2 years on P2 
instead of 1 and 1, regression to previous license stage after a 
disqualification removed 
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Queensland 
Nov-1982 Lowering of max permissible BAC for drivers from 0.08 percent to 0.05 percent 
Feb-1983 driver education lectures introduced for drivers who accumulate 5 or more demerit points 
Dec-1984 lowering max BAC for all drivers under 18 years from 0.05 percent to 0.02 percent BAC 
Aug-1986 reduce imparied driving campaign (marketing) introduced 
Dec-1988 random breath testing commenced 
Jan-1991 
Introduction of the new three stage driver license sytem: 0.02 percent BAC 
limit for all drivers under 25, minimum holding period for learner's (6 wks 
for Jan 1 1991 to Feb 28 1991, 3 mo for Mar 1 1991 to Apr 30 1991, 6 mo 
after May 1 1991 and going forward), P license for 3 years for age 17-22, 2 
years for age 23, 1 year for age 24. 
1999 zero BAC for underage learners and P platers, no compulsory L plates at this time 
1-Jul-2007 
Learner's permit available at 16 instead of 16 years plus 6 months, extend 
the learner holding period from 6 to 12 months, supervised driving 
experience 100 hours including 10 hours night driving (increased from 0) in 
a logbook, mobile phone ban (even for hands free) for learners and P1 
drivers, no loudspeaker function for mobile phones of passengers when 
learner or P1 is driving, zero BAC for learners regardless of age, P tier split 
into P1 and P2 with hazard test to pass between them, L and P plates 
compulsory, restriction to only one peer passenger for P1 drivers under 21 
between 11pm and 5am 
 
Western Australia 
9-Dec-1982 0.02 percent BAC limit for probationary drivers and increase in all drink driving penalties 
1-Oct-1988 random breathalizer testing legislation introduced 
Jan-1989 mandatory breath testing of drivers involved in crashes 
1989 L and P tiers already in place at this time; P tier holding period 12 months, no zero BAC 
13-Jan-1991 speed cameras became fully operational 
2005 proposed (if passed, would have been implemented 2007) but DID NOT 
IMPLEMENT similar recommendations to increase restrictions on GDL 
1-Dec-2010 Introduced graduated demerit point system for novice (L and P) drivers 
1-Mar-2011 stricter mobile phone laws (not targeting novices at all) 
Oct-2011 
The following was proposed but not implemented: P plate would last three 
years up from two, P1 night time ban and >1 peer passenger restriction, P 
plate age increase from 17 to 18 
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Tasmania 
1965 Provisional license introduced, 3 year term for novice drivers and some offenders 
1971 Provisional period reduced to 1 year (from?), P-plates and 80kmh limit introduced 
1-Feb-1971 
zero BAC introduced for first year drivers, preliminary breath screening 
tests introduced, drivers over .15 BAC deemed to be under the influence of 
alcohol 
1-Nov-1971 compulsory wearing of seatbelts where fitted (if seatbelt exists in car?) 
1989 increase in duration of learner permit from 3 months to 1 year 
1-Jan-1991 
3 year provisional license introduced, 80 kmh limit and P-plates for the first 
year, zero BAC restriction on novices, motorcycle motor size restriction 
and no pillion for first year motorcycle riders 
18-Dec-1991 stiffer drunk-driving laws, including a graduated penalty scale 
25-Aug-2008 
P1 and P2 stages made explicit instead of just year-one and year-two, 
driving reward offered (refund license fees for good behavior), minimum 
holding period for P1 is 1 year, minimum holding period for P2 is 2 years, 
tougher penalties for learners who drive without a correct supervisor, 
tougher penalties for those who fail to display L and P plates, regression to 
previous stage for violators in the GDL system, start P1 over for minor 
infractions (seatbelt, mobile phone, speeding, plate display) 
Apr-2009 L stage is split into L1 and L2 with specific 3 month and 9 month holding periods, only the L2 logbook is audited, 
2-Mar-2015 For L2 and P1 drivers, at 90 can drive 90, at 100 can drive 90, at 110 can drive 100 
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Northern Territory 
2-Dec-1974 provisional license introduced, duration 12 months, minimum age 16 years, maximum speed 50mph 
20-Nov-1981 maximum speed provisional license set to 80kmh 
1-Feb-1984 minimum age 16 years for learners permit lowered from 17 
May-1986 photoraphic licenses introduced but allowed two days to produce license in case of violation 
Oct-1987 zero BAC for learner and provisional drivers, 
1988 80 kmh limit for learner drivers and riders, provisional license 
automatically cancelled for drink driving and dangerous driving 
11-Nov-1992 drivers tested on automatic vehicle restricted to automatics while on provisional license 
1-Jul-1994 
learners permit minimum duration 6 months for cars, minimum age 16 
years 6 months for provisional license but 16 years if applicant has passed 
an approved course 
1-Jan-2007 lack of speed limit abolished, 130km/h on major highway and 110km/h on all other roads 
1-Jul-2007 
demerit system introduced, graduated licensing restrictions introduced(?), 
drink driving clauses(?). minimum 6 month holding period for learner 
licenses, provisional license 2 year holding period, mobile phone ban for 
novice drivers 
 
Australian Capital Territory 
27-Sep-1993 
minimum age for learners permit for cars decreased from 16+9mo to 16 
years, minimum duration for learners permit changed to 6 months, 
provisional licenses introduced (min age 17 years, duration 3 years, display 
P plates first year only, carry license, 0.02 BAC limit) 
2000 road ready plus training program introduced  
1-Jul-2007 mobile phone restriction even for handsfree 
1-Dec-2010 Zero BAC law for novice drivers 
 
 
Note: this table contains a timeline of policy changes in Australian States and Territories that may plausibly effect 
youth road fatalities. These dates and events were sourced from government memoranda, research reports, and 
online newspaper articles. Statements in some of these sources directly contradict each other, and have been 
subjectively selected based on publication date, tone and quantity of content, and cross checking with other sources 
where possible.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 In this dissertation, I demonstrate that after Uber’s arrival in New York City, counties 
that received ride-hailing access experienced a significant drop in alcohol-related collisions 
compared to counties that did not. The first study in this dissertation measures a significantly 
larger effect in the sample of New York State counties than some national studies find in their 
average effect across many U.S. cities and counties. Applied to different data sets and using 
different methodologies, the study of ride-hailing’s effect on drunk-driving outcomes produces a 
range of results, among which is that there was no measurable effect. Most of the research in this 
area shows, however, that significant improvement in access to ride-hailing services preceded 
significant improvement in drunk-driving measures for different U.S. locations. In contrast, some 
strengthening of Australia’s novice-driver training process showed no measurable improvement 
in youth-driver road fatalities, supporting the theory that novice-driver training is a function of 
experience, not intensity of training.  
Next steps for this research depend in part on data access. In measuring the ride-hailing 
effect on drunk-driving outcomes, generating a treatment-on-the-treated estimate based either on 
observed Uber and Lyft wait times in a neighborhood or number of pickups per day could 
produce better-identified estimates. Localities continue to accept, ban, and renew access for ride-
hailing services, creating small natural experiments that empiricists may exploit with difference-
in-differences strategies.  
Research progress in this research area also depends in part on the passage of time. New 
in-car technologies are released each year, and they will have differential effects on driving. In 
the long run, ride-hailing will affect car ownership, housing choice, and the trip choices people 
make. Proposed technology within cars and trucks may work to thwart distracted, fatigued, 
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intoxicated, or reckless driving and chip away at the nationally-decreasing road fatality rate. If 
full autopilot functionality becomes available, it may render both drunk driving and novice-
driver training anachronistic. These issues will determine the future landscape of the youth 
fatality rate and the traffic fatality rate.  
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